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I. INTRODUCTION
Attention debtors: if you want to prevent your creditors from seizing
your assets and have not filed for bankruptcy, please read below to find
out how you can do what millionaire debtors have been doing for years.
Debtors, with the right advice, can keep their lavish lifestyles and
discharge their debts. Just follow the steps listed in Part IV and you too
can legally prevent creditors from collecting judgments even though you
have the assets to pay the debts owed. While the above is an
oversimplification, it does not diminish the fact that a significant loophole
exists in the Bankruptcy Code ("Code").' And, as explained below, any
debtor with sufficient planning and who has available assets can prevent
creditors from reaching those assets.2
In the past, wealthy debtors liquidated assets and purchased new,
lavish homes in states with unlimited homestead exemptions.' Those
debtors would then file for bankruptcy.' Because the debtor was
insolvent, the assets the debtor liquidated should have gone to creditors
before purchasing the home.s But, by purchasing the home the debtor
took assets creditors could obtain, non-exempt assets, and placed those
assets into the homestead, an exempt asset.' In states with unlimited
1 11 U.S.C. SS 1-1532 (2007).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 592-93 (2005) (listing seven infamous debtors who prevented
creditors from reaching millions of dollars of the debtor's assets, when the debtor bought a lavish
mansion prior to filing for bankruptcy). Any debtor may shield an unlimited amount of their assets
from creditors in certain states with unlimited homestead exemptions. Id. What this article contends,
and Congress has argued, is that a wealthy debtor should not get a head start by retaining lavish homes
bought with assets that should be used to pay off creditors' claims. See id. at 16 (arguing debtors
should not be able to move to states with unlimited homestead exemption and shield equity and assets
from creditors). It seems incongruous that Americans with higher incomes pay a higher percentage in
income tax because they have the ability to pay, while higher income debtors with the proper planning
pay far less back, percentage-wise, to creditors than the average debtor. Cf Adam S. Chodorow,
Biblical Tax Systems and the Case for Progressive Taxation, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 51, 58 (2007) (examining
progressive taxation from a religious perspective and quoting bishops as stating, "[t]he tax system
should be structured according to the principle of progressivity, so that those with relatively greater
financial resources pay a higher rate of taxation.").
See H.R REP. No. 109-31, at 591 (2005).
4 See id.
5 See, e.g., Juliet M. Moringiello, Symposium, Has Congress Slimmed Down the Hogs? A Look at
the BAPCPA Approach to Pre-Bankmptcy Planning, 15 WIDENER L.J. 615, 620 (2006) (explaining how
debtors plan for bankruptcy and discussing cases of homestead exemption abuse in Florida).
6 The homestead is an asset that can be exempted by asserting that the property is exempt
pursuant to either section 522(b)(3)(A) or section 522(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11
U.S.C. 5 522(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2007) (stating that debtors may exempt property of the bankruptcy estate
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homestead exemptions, unsecured creditors in bankruptcy cannot obtain
any value from the homestead.! Thus, through these actions a debtor
could funnel non-exempt assets into an exempt homestead and prevent
creditors from collecting on his claims.8
Legally, any debtor can take advantage of this form of "bankruptcy
planning," but some cases are more egregious than others. For example,
actor Burt Reynolds used this form of bankruptcy planning, buying an
opulent mansion and then discharging his debts.' He declared bankruptcy
in 1996, claiming $10 million in debt.10 Yet, he kept his $2.5 million
home and only paid his creditors twenty cents on the dollar." Paul
Bilzerian, a corporate take-over artist, also planned wisely for his
bankruptcy, buying a $5 million home in Florida before filing.12  Mr.
Bilzerian retained this home and avoided approximately $200 million in
debt he owed to the IRS and other creditors.
Congress sought to prevent such opportunistic and abusive behavior
when it passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA").14 Congress felt preventing creditors
from collecting on debts through bankruptcy planning was fundamentally
unfair to those disadvantaged creditors and may have a negative effect
upon the economy." Indeed, Congress recognized that, included in the
if listed in section 522(2) or 522(3)).
7 See infra note 82 and accompanying text (listing as the only creditors in Florida who may
foreclose on a resident's homestead: 1) city, state, or municipal agencies collecting tax liens; 2)
creditors who hold a mechanic's lien against the real property; or 3) creditors who are purchase-
money mortgagees). This article examines the unlimited homestead exemptions provided by:
Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. See infra Appendix
A (providing a list of each state's unlimited homestead exemption).
8 As explained above, debtors will liquidate assets and place the proceeds in exempt assets to
prevent creditors from collecting on claims. See Elijah M. Alper, Opportunistic Ifonnal Bankruptcy:
How BAPCPA May Fail to Make Wealthy Debtors Pay Up, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1908, 1929-30 (2007)
(noting how before BAPCPA, debtors in anticipation of bankruptcy might liquidate "personal
property and transfer the proceeds into home equity.") (citation omitted).
9 H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 592 (2005).
1o Id.
" Id.
12 Id. at 593.
13 Id. For other egregious abuses of unlimited homestead exemptions see id. at 592-93.
14 H.R REP. NO. 109-31, at 15-16 (2005) (stating BAPCPA deters the use of the "mansion
loophole," where debtors move to a state with an unlimited homestead exemption and place millions
of dollars out of reach of creditors, funneling assets into the new, exempt homestead).
Is See id. at 2-3. Further, in a footnote, Congress agreed with Professor Todd Zywicki,
finding "[b]ankruptcy is a moral as well as an economic act." Id. at 2 n.1. A debtor who fails to keep
his promise to repay is allowed to receive a benefit at the expense of the creditor. See id. Without
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cost of every bill or loan Americans receive, exists a bankruptcy tax - an
additional amount of money citizens must pay to offset the losses
businesses incur when they cannot collect on debts." For example, the
current mortgage crisis has caused fewer companies to offer student loans,
and the interest rates on available student loans have risen dramatically."
The economy can be greatly affected by defaulting debtors, and with the
recent sub-prime mortgage crisis, this point has never been more
abundantly clear.t" Regardless of whether debtors default on credit card
payments or on their home mortgage loans, when debtors become
insolvent the effects spread exponentially, and they can have a disastrous
impact on the nation's economy."
Further, when debtors take advantage of homestead exemptions and
prevent creditors from collecting on debts, credit may become unavailable
to lower-income borrowers.20 President Bush cited the lack of available
credit as one of his reasons for signing BAPCPA into law on April 20,
2005, stating that debtors have "walked away from debts even when they
had the ability to repay them," making credit less available for blue-collar
workers.2 1
Unfortunately, whether due to poor drafting or political compromise,
this article demonstrates that Congress failed to stop debtors from abusing
unlimited state homestead exemptions even after passing BAPCPA.
Married debtors in many states can still funnel non-exempt assets into an
exempt homestead by using the tenancy by the entirety exemption ("TBE
Exemption") located in section 522(b)(3)(B) of the Code. This article
examines this loophole and argues that Congress should close the tenancy
payment, there is no reciprocity, and, "[p]romise-keeping and reciprocity are the foundation of an
economy and a healthy civil society." Id.
16 Id. at 4.
17 See Katy Marquardt, Student Loans Feel the Pinch: Private Lenders Tighten Credit Standards and
Raise Rates, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 10, 2008, at 45 (noting that because of so many debtors
defaulting on sub-prime mortgages, other sectors of the economy, such as student loans, have been
severely affected).
18 Cf id. (explaining how buyers on the secondary market for student loans have stopped
purchasing "bundled loans").
19 Cf Reint Gropp et al., Personal Bankrupty and Credit Supply and Demand, 112 Qj. ECON
217, 220 (1997), discussed infra note 100 and accompanying text (noting that credit may be less
available for lower-income borrowers in states that have high homestead exemptions when compared
to states without large homestead exemptions, and automobile interest rates in those states may also
be higher than in other states).
2 Id.
21 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention, Consumer Protection Act, P.L. 109-08, Statement by
President George W. Bush upon Signing S. 256, Apr. 20,2005, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.CA.N. S7.
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by the entirety loophole ("TBE Loophole") to achieve BAPCPA's
intended purpose: preventing debtors from abusing certain states'
unlimited homestead exemptions.22
Initially, this article will study two different Code exemptions debtors
may use: 1) the homestead exemption that is located in section
522(b)(3) (A) ("Homestead Provision") and 2) the TBE Exemption that is
located in section 522(b)(3)(B). Then the article will provide legislative
history and case law to demonstrate that Congress intended to prevent the
abusive use of unlimited state homestead exemptions when it passed
section 522(o), (p), and (q). A hypothetical will then showcase the TBE
Loophole and demonstrate how the loophole renders section 522(o), (p),
and (q) de facto nullified as applied to certain debtors. Finally, the article
propounds a solution to close the TBE Loophole and prevent abuse of the
Code, just as Congress intended but ultimately failed to accomplish.
Specifically, this article seeks to compel Congress to re-write the Code
and apply the homestead exemption-limiting provisions of section 522(o),
(p), and (q) to the TBE Exemption, located in section 522(b)(3)(B).
II. OVERVIEW OF CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY, HOMESTEAD
EXEMPTIONS AND THE TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY EXEMPTION
A Relevant Consumer Bankruptcy Code Sections
Understanding the exemptions and loopholes warrants a broad
overview of consumer bankruptcy. Consumer debtors who intend to file
for bankruptcy start by choosing which chapter of the Code they want to
use when filing a petition.' Chapter 7 is generically called a liquidation
because all of the debtor's non-exempt assets are used to pay creditors.24
In contrast, Chapter 13, which is generically an adjustment of the debts of
"an individual with regular income," forces the debtor to present to the
bankruptcy court a plan for repaying certain debts according to the
requirements in the Code.25 Bankruptcy petitioners usually opt for
Chapter 7 to protect property they will acquire after filing for
2 Many bankruptcy courts have interpreted Congressional intent as it pertains to BAPCPA's
changes to homestead exemptions. See In re Wayrynen, 332 B.R. 479 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005). In
Wayrynen, the Court understood that Congress, in passing BAPCPA, intended to limit the amount the
debtor could exempt as his homestead to the amount set out in 11 U.S.C. S 522(p). Id. at 483.
23 See WILLIAM D. WARREN & DANIELJ. BUSSEL, BANKRuPTcY 509 (7th ed. 2006).
24 Id. at 19.
2 Id. at 20-21.
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bankruptcy.26 When a debtor files for Chapter 7 all the debtor's property
goes into the bankruptcy estate.27 The bankruptcy estate includes "all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of the case."2 8
On the other hand, debtors who choose to file for Chapter 13 usually
do so in an attempt to protect currently owned property." Debtors then
propose a plan to pay creditors a percentage of their claims.30 Owning a
home, in many cases, is the dispositive factor in deciding which chapter a
debtor will file under because most debtors want to protect their home."
Debtors that own homes are 2,772 percent more likely to file for Chapter
13 rather than Chapter 7,32 and prior to BAPCPA's passage, a debtor could
file for Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 at his own discretion.3  Pre-BAPCPA,
about one-third of all debtors chose to file for Chapter 13.
2 Cf id. at 541 (explaining that based on the differences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13,
"one might predict that those debtors with relatively large unsecured debts, few secured debts, and
little non-exempt property would disproportionately choose Chapter 7"). Because these debtors do
not possess a substantial amount of non-exempt assets, they are looking to the future, while debtors
who file Chapter 13 are seeking to protect non-exempt assets they currently own. See id. at 539.
Bankruptcy law shorthand is used throughout the article. When the article mentions a
debtor, "filing for Chapter 7" or "filing for Chapter 13," this means that the debtor is filing his
bankruptcy petition pursuant to 11 U.S.C. SS 701-27 or 11 U.S.C. SS 1301-30.
V See 11 U.S.C. S 541(a)(1) (2007) (stating that at the beginning of a bankruptcy case, all
interests the debtor has in property become property of the bankruptcy estate).
2 U.S. v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 198 (1983) (citing 11 U.S.C. S 541(a)(1)). In
Whiting Pools, the Court held that property the IRS seized before the debtor filed for bankruptcy was
still a part of the bankruptcy estate, and the IRS must turn the property over to the bankruptcy estate.
Id. at 211-12.
9 See WARREN & BUSSEL, supra note 23, at 541 (arguing that debtors with many non-exempt
assets will choose Chapter 13 to keep and preserve those assets).
0 See 11 U.S.C. S 1325 (2007) (allowing a debtor in Chapter 13 to file a plan and keep the
assets already owned as long as the debtor complies with the requirements put forth in Chapter 13 of
the Code). Generally speaking, in the plan the debtor must: 1) pay each secured creditor the present
value equal to the amount of their claim; and 2) pay each unsecured creditor at least what that creditor
would have received if the case was filed in Chapter 7. See WARREN & BUSSEL, supra note 23, at 539.
31 See Ian Domowitz & Robert L. Sartain, Incentives and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice: Evidence
from the Reform Act of 1978, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 481 (1999) (concluding that homeownership
greatly enhances the likelihood a debtor will file for Chapter 13).
32 Id. In addition, if a debtor has a high level of equity in his home he is eleven times more
likely to file for a Chapter 13 reorganization. Id.
33 WARREN & BUSSEL, supra note 23, at 509.
34 See id. (according to the Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts in 2004, approximately 450,000 Chapter 13 cases were filed, but more than 1.1 million
Chapter 7 cases were filed).
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When a debtor files for bankruptcy, either under Chapter 7 or
Chapter 13, he receives immediate protection."s All legal actions a
creditor may take in state court are stopped pursuant to section 362 of the
Code, also known as the "automatic stay,"3 but some creditors may seek
relief from the automatic stay to enforce, create, or perfect any lien 7
against property of the bankruptcy estate.38 Just as debtors file bankruptcy
petitions to protect themselves, creditors too must file claims in
bankruptcy court to protect their interests.
Under Chapter 7, if the bankruptcy court approves the creditor's
claim, fully secured creditors are usually paid in full.40 On the other hand,
unsecured creditors will only receive a pro-rata portion of their claims, or
they may receive nothing at all.41 In Chapter 7, the Code determines the
3 See Sarah Keith-Bolden, Down and Out and Now Kicked Out: Residential Lease Evictions and
the Automatic Stay, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. 585, 591 (2007) (explaining that when a debtor files for
bankruptcy all the debtor's property is placed in the bankruptcy estate, and all property in the
bankruptcy estate is protected from any action a creditor may bring to obtain possession of the
debtor's property) (citation omitted).
36 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. S 362(a)(4) (2007) (preventing "all entities" from performing "any act to
create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate").
3 "The term 'lien' means charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or
performance of an obligation." Id. S 101(37).
3 Robert A. Izard, Jr. & Kathleen M. Porter, Issues in Litigation: Proof of Relief From Stay, 2
BANKR. L. & PRAc. 891, 893 (1993) (explaining in what circumstances a creditor may receive "relief
from stay," allowing that creditor to "pursue whatever remedies it has against the collateral and the
debtor outside of bankruptcy"). A creditor may receive relief from stay if: 1) the creditor's interest in
the property is not adequately protected by the debtor; or 2) if the debtor has no equity in the property
and the property is not necessary for the debtor to reorganize. Id.
3 See 11 U.S.C. S 726(a)(2) (2007) (allowing property of the bankruptcy estate to be
distributed only for "allowed unsecured claim[s]"). When a court "allows" a claim, this means it is
recognized by the bankruptcy court as valid for the amount the creditor claimed. WARREN & BUSSEL,
supra note 23, at 83.
4 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk &Jesse M. Fried,A NewApproads to Valuing Secured Claims in Bankmuptcy,
114 HARV. L REV. 2386, 2395 (2001) (explaining that it is fundamental to the Bankruptcy Code that secured
debtors are paid up to the value of the collateral, the amount the creditor is owed); see also 11 U.S.C. 5
506(a)(1) (2007) (stating that the creditor is owed the amount secured and any amount the creditor is owed
that is over the value ofthe collateral will be considered an unsecured claim).
41 When a debtor files for Chapter 7, the Code pays secured creditors up to the extent they
are secured; it then pays certain unsecured creditors based on "priority," as set forth in section 507 of
the Code. See 11 U.S.C. 5 507 (2007) (listing ten priority claims that are paid before unsecured
creditors' claims are paid). Unsecured creditors usually receive no payment in Chapter 7
bankruptcies or are only paid a percentage of their claims. See WARREN & BUSSEL, supra note 23, at
349. In over ninety-five percent of all Chapter 7 cases, debtors have no assets, and thus, there is
nothing to distribute to unsecured creditors. Id. at 509.
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distribution of the debtor's assets;42 in Chapter 13, the debtor's plan
determines how creditors are paid.43 However, the plan must satisfy
certain criteria set forth in the Code."
Another actor in bankruptcy court is the trustee. It is the trustee's job
to preserve and protect the bankruptcy estate and facilitate the equitable
distribution of the estate to creditors.4 5 In many respects, the trustee's
interests are aligned with unsecured creditors, and it is the trustee's
responsibility to make sure no creditor is advantaged to the detriment of
another."
Whether a debtor files under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, the Code
provides opportunities to protect his property and assets.47 Section 522 of
the Code sets out exemptions debtors may use to prevent creditors from
obtaining the value of certain assets.48 Section 522 exempts certain
property that is already in the bankruptcy estate, and thus, the property is
protected from any process a creditor may bring.49 Debtors may use the
federal exemptions listed in section 522(d) unless the state in which they
are domiciled is an "opt-out" state.50  In opt-out states, debtors use
exemptions provided by state law.51  Thus, in opt-out states, the
42 See generally supra note 41.
4 See 11 U.S.C. 5S 1321-30 (2007).
4 See id. S 1325 (listing the requirements a debtor must satisfy before a plan is confirmed); see
also supra note 30 (explaining the general requirements a debtor in Chapter 13 must meet).
45 Cf 11 U.S.C. 5 547 (2007) (allowing the trustee to avoid transfers that are contrary to the
Code's method of assets distribution or contrary to the list of preferences provided by the Code); Id. S
548 (allowing the trustee to avoid any transfer that was fraudulent as to creditors, thereby pulling the
fraudulently transferred asset back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors).
4 The trustee pulls assets into the estate so unsecured creditors may be paid a greater
percentage of their claims. See id. S 548. Similarly, the Code is designed to allow for an "orderly
liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated equally." WARREN & BUSSEL, supra note
23, at 213 (citing from the House Report on the changes made to the Bankruptcy Code in 1978).
47 See generally 11 U.S.C. S 522 (2007) (listing all the exemptions a debtor may take under
federal law and allowing the debtor to take certain state law exemptions under specified conditions).
4 See id. S 522(b)(1) (allowing debtors to exempt property listed in subsequent sections of the
Code).
4 See id. (stating "an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property
listed" in the subsequent paragraphs). Since the property is within the bankruptcy estate, creditors
cannot bring legal claims against it in bankruptcy court. See id. S 362(a) (preventing creditors from
creating, perfecting, or enforcing any lien against property of the bankruptcy estate).
s See id. S 522(b)(2) (stating that exempt property is property listed in section 522(d) "unless
the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (3)(A)," the homestead exemption,
specifically does not authorize the use of federal exemptions).
s' See In re McNabb, 326 B.R. 785, 786 n.1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (explaining that Arizona is
one of those states that has opted-out of the federal exemptions located in section 522(d) of the Code,
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substantive rights and protections a debtor receives when invoking these
exemptions are based wholly on state law.5 2 The Code in this situation
functions more as a procedural body of law, giving the debtor the
opportunity to invoke state exemptions." At the same time, the Code
can, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause,' substantively constrain these
exemptions provided by state law."
Just as debtors have many opportunities to exempt assets, trustees and
creditors can look to the Code and state law to prevent debtors from
concealing assets or committing fraud.56 This article discusses, in detail,
fraudulent transfers with respect to state homestead exemptions. For
fraudulent transfers, the trustee may use either section 548 of the Code,
which specifically deals with fraudulent transfers, or applicable state law.
The state law dealing with fraudulent transfers is primarily the state's
version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA").5 1
and thus, debtors in the state may only use state exemptions).
52 See In re Kaplan, 331 B.R. 483, 484 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) (citing certain opt-out states
such as Arizona and Florida, which force debtors to use state exemptions). There are thirty-seven
states that have opted out of federal exemptions. See Richard M. Hynes et al., The Political Economy of
Property Exemption Laws, 47 J.L. & EcON. 19, 25-26 (2004) (providing a table that lists all the states that
have opted-out). There are currently only two non-opt-out states, Minnesota and Texas. In these
states, a debtor may choose between using federal exemptions or state exemptions. Thus, there are
eleven states where residents must use federal exemptions. Thomas F. Waldron & Neil M. Berman,
Principled Principles of Statutory Interpretation: A Judicial Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 Am.
BANKR. L.J. 195, 202 (2007).
5 See infra note 68 (explaining how the Code is set up to preserve Federalism, giving the
federal government the ability to set up the Bankruptcy Code, but reserving to the states the ability to
define property rights when debtors file for bankruptcy).
5 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The federal government has the power to make laws
concerning bankruptcies. Id. art. I, S 8, cl. 4. Thus, in the area of bankruptcy law, Congress can
abrogate state law.
ss The most obvious example, and one this article discusses in detail, is Congress constraining
the protections of state homestead exemptions by passing 11 U.S.C. S 522(o), (p), and (q). See 11
U.S.C. S 522(o), (p), (q) (2007).
56 See id. S 548(a)(1)(A) (permitting the trustee to avoid a transfer made with the intent to
"hinder, delay, or defraud" a creditor); Id. 5 544(b)(1) (allowing the trustee to step into the shoes of an
unsecured creditor and use any state law that would be available to an unsecured creditor seeking to
obtain payment for a claim in state court).
5 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (explaining the duties of the trustee to protect
unsecured creditors and property belonging in the bankruptcy estate); 11 U.S.C. 5 544(b)(1) (2007)
(giving the trustee the power to avoid a transfer by the debtor if the transfer was voidable by any
creditor holding an unsecured claim in state court).
5 See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, Refs. & Annots. (1984) (listing forty-four states
that have adopted the UFTA).
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Finally, if the trustee or creditors cannot prevail under section 548 or
the UFTA, they still may seek the strictest sanction available, denying the
debtor his discharge under section 727.59 The trustee or creditors may ask
the court to deny the debtor's discharge for many reasons.' For example,
a court may deny a debtor his discharge if: 1) the debtor intentionally
defrauded a creditor or an officer of the estate;" 2) the, debtor "concealed,
destroyed . .. falsified, or failed to . . . preserve" records unless such an act
was justified under the circumstances;62 3) the debtor lied under oath;' or
4) the debtor failed to explain the disappearance of assets.' Denying the
debtor discharge under section 727 is the harshest sanction a bankruptcy
court can impose and most courts are reluctant to do so.
B. Code Sections a Debtor Must Use to Take Advantage of the "Tenancy by
the Entirety Loophole"
Now that the relevant Code provisions have been briefly explained,
this article will discuss, in detail, the Code sections a debtor must use to
take advantage of the TBE Loophole. As a threshold matter, a state must
have an unlimited state homestead exemption and recognize the tenancy
by the entirety estate for the TBE Loophole to function. This article will
now discuss: 1) the Code's Homestead Provision, section 522(b)(3) (A); 2)
unlimited state homestead exemptions; 3) the Code's TBE Exemption,
section 522(b)(3)(B); and 4) state tenancy by the entirety laws. However
before delving into the intricacies of these areas of law, analytical
clarification is needed to explain how Code provisions and state laws
interact for the purpose of explaining the TBE Loophole.
As will be explained in Part IV, the TBE Exemption and
corresponding state tenancy by the entirety laws are important only
because of the procedural opportunity these laws afford debtors. Simply
put, when a debtor owns his home as a tenant by the entirety, this allows
s9 Section 727 of the Code gives the bankruptcy court the power to deny a debtor his
discharge if the debtor commits certain acts or fails to perform certain acts. See 11 U.S.C. S 727(a)(1)-
(12) (2007).
6o See id.
61 Id. 5 727(a)(2).
62 Id. S 727(a)(3).
6 Id. S 727(a)(4)(A).
6 11 U.S.C. S 727(a)(5) (2007).
6 Cf In re Booth, 70 B.R. 391, 394 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987) (holding that because denying a
debtor his discharge is a much harsher sanction than excepting a debt from discharge, the burden of
proof that must be satisfied by the party requesting the denial is clear and convincing evidence).
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him to use the TBE Exemption located in section 522(b)(3)(B)." Then,
by choosing the TBE Exemption, the debtor can take advantage of the
substantive protections provided by certain states' unlimited homestead
exemptions without any of the Code's homestead exemption-limiting
provisions applying to the debtor's homestead.'
This article examines state tenancy by the entirety laws only because
they allow debtors in bankruptcy to exploit unlimited state homestead
exemptions." State tenancy by the entirety laws also provide debtors with
protections, such as the "TBE Shield," which applies concurrently with
state homestead exemptions.69  This article, however, is not concerned
with the substantive protections state tenancy by the entirety laws provide,
either in bankruptcy court or in state court. With that said, state
homestead exemptions will now be examined.
C. State Homestead Exemptions: History, Policy, and Abuse
Homestead exemptions, which protect the debtor's principal
residence,o are a controversial and important exemption available to all
6 See In re Hinton, 378 B.R. 371, 376 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (explaining that a debtor must
own his home as a tenant by the entirety according to state law to claim property as exempt pursuant
to section 522(b)(3)(B)).
67 See infra note 209 and accompanying text (explaining how section 522(o), (p), and (q) of
the Code does not apply to the TBE Exemption, allowing debtors to take advantage of a loophole in
the Code).
6 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 48-49 (1979) (holding that the Bankruptcy Code
generally leaves the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law").
In this way, the Code allows Congress to control bankruptcies, in accordance with Article 1, Section 8
of the Constitution, but at the same time does not usurp states' rights, preserving federalism. Compare
id. (preserving states' rights in determining the assets of the debtor) with U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8
(stating "Congress shall have Power ... [t]o establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States").
69 See Robert Laurence, Attacking the Acquisition and Forcing the Sale of an Indivisible Arkansas
Homestead, 55 ARK. L. REV. 473, 477 (2002) (noting that the protections the tenancy by the entirety
estate provides under state law apply in addition to the protections provided by the state homestead
exemption). State homestead exemptions provide much more protection than the tenancy by the
entirety estate does. See id. at 475-77 (using a hypothetical to demonstrate how the tenancy by the
entirety estate will not protect the homestead in certain situations, while, in the same hypothetical,
state homestead exemptions will apply to shield the property from creditors). For an in-depth
explanation about the concurrent applications and respective protections provided by the tenancy by
the entirety estate when compared to state homestead exemptions see id.
7 The homestead in Oklahoma is defined as, "[t]he home ofsuch person, provided that such
home is the principal residence of such person." OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 31, 5 I(A)(1) (West 2007); see
also IOWA CODE ANN. S 561.16 (West 2008) (describing the homestead as where the resident
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debtors. " Originally, the homestead exemption was created by state law;
Texas first recognized and incorporated a homestead exemption into its
Constitution in 1845.72 Along with other exemption laws, the homestead
exemption protected the debtor and his family from becoming wards of
the state. The idea behind the exemption was that debtors should be
given enough property and income to "keep going and to make a fresh
start toward solvency."" Texas cited three major public policy rationales
for the homestead exemption: 1) the protection of debtors; 2) the
protection of women; and 3) fostering the spirit of settler's
independence. Other courts have commented that the "object of all
homestead legislation is to protect the home, to furnish shelter for the
family, and to promote the interest and welfare of society... ."s Most
states provide citizens with homestead protection," but do so in widely
varying forms.
Texas, Florida, Iowa, Oklahoma, Kansas, Arkansas, and the District of
Columbia have adopted some form of unlimited homestead exemptions.
"habitually reside [s]").
7 See Jeremy Berkowitz & Richard Hynes, Bankruptcy Exemptions and the Market for Mortgage
Loans, 42 J.L. & ECON. 809, 810 (1999) (stating that many debtors file for bankruptcy for the sole
purpose of retaining their home by discharging other debts). One must distinguish between state
homestead exemptions, which are provided by state law and are substantive, and the Code's
Homestead Provision, section 522(b)(3)(A), which simply provides debtors with the opportunity to
use their state's homestead exemption in federal bankruptcy court, and thus is procedural in nature.
72 James W. Paulsen, Introduction: The Texas Home Equity Controversy in Context, 26 ST. MARYS
L.J. 307, 310 (1995).
7 WARREN & BUSSEL, supra note 23, at 61.
74 Paulsen, supra note 72, at 310-12. Texas originally enacted the exemption to encourage
immigration, providing settlers with a fresh start after the Panic of 1837. Id. at 310. Additionally,
Texas wanted to prevent "forced sales" by the courts so that its residents retained a sense of freedom
and independence necessary for the existence of democratic institutions. Id. at 312.
7s Gross v. Gross, 491 N.W.2d 751, 753 (S.D. 1992) (quoting Kingman v. O'Callaghan, 57
N.W. 912, 915 (S.D. 1894)). Arkansas courts have held that "[t]he object of homestead laws is the
protection of the family from dependence and want." Middleton v. Lockhart, 43 S.W.3d 113, 119
(Ark. 2001) (citations omitted). "It is intended to preserve the family home." Id. (citations omitted).
"Further, the law is to be liberally construed in the interest of the family home." Id.
76 See Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics ofConsumer Finance, 4 AM. L. &
ECON. REv. 168, 178 (2002).
n Virginia's paltry homestead exemption is capped at $5,000. VA. CODE ANN. S 34-4 (West
2007). While other states, such as Kansas, provide its citizens with an unlimited exemption. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. S 60-2301 (West 2007). But see Hynes & Posner, supra note 76, at 178 (listing a majority
of states that, as of 1996, had homestead exemptions of less than $100,000).
7 See FLA. CONST. art. X, S 4(a)(1) (providing Florida residents with a state constitutional
right to hold their homestead, up to 160 acres, free from "forced sale under process of any court, and
no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon" except with respect to purchase money
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For a simple overview of the details of these states' unlimited exemptions,
please see the chart infra in Appendix A. This article focuses only on states
with unlimited homestead exemptions because unlimited exemptions are
the easiest to abuse."
With this in mind, in 1845, Texas included in its Constitution a
homestead exemption that denied judgment creditors the right to force
judicial sale of the home and denied them the ability to attach judicial
liens to homestead property.' Texas law currently sets out eight specific
exceptions to this original constitutional homestead exemption, such as
for reverse mortgages and second mortgages. But in general, these
exceptions only apply when the debtor contracts for a consensual, secured
lien on the homestead, giving a creditor the ability to foreclose on the
property.8 Florida's constitutional homestead exemption is similar to
Texas's and protects the homestead from foreclosure brought by
unsecured creditors and prevents the attachment of liens.' Iowa's
unlimited homestead exemption also protects the homestead both from
judicial sale and judicial liens but does so through statute.'
mortgage liens, mechanic's liens and tax liens); ARK. CONST. art. IX, SS 3-5 (providing residents with
a state constitutional right to hold their homestead free of any liens, for up to one acre in the city and
160 acres outside of the city, with the exceptions of purchase money mortgages, tax liens, and
mechanic's liens); D.C. CODE ANN. S 15-501(a)(14) (LexisNexis 2007) (providing D.C. residents
with a statutory homestead exemption, which protects all interest in a residence from the attachment
of liens, with exceptions only for deeds of trust, mortgages, mechanic's liens, or tax liens); see also
Hynes & Posner, supra note 76, at 178 (listing Texas, Iowa, Oklahoma, and Kansas as states with
unlimited homestead exemptions); In re McDonald, 279 B.R. 382, 383 n.1 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2002)
(noting that the District of Columbia joined both Florida and Texas by providing its citizens with an
unlimited homestead exemption). South Dakota's homestead exemption is also unlimited, but is only
available to debtors seventy years and older. See Daniel MormanJudgment Liens, Homestead Exemptions
and Involuntary Banknipties: Who Gets What After BAPCPA, 24 AM. BANKR. INST.J., Aug. 2005, at 20.
9 See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text (presenting prior cases of abuse and explaining
how debtors take advantage of unlimited homestead exemptions).
s TEX. CONST. art. XVI, 5 50 (amended 2007); Paulsen, supra note 72, at 310.
81 See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, S 50 (amended 2007) (listing the eight exceptions, which
include, among others, consensual liens, mechanic's liens, reverse mortgages, and second mortgages).
For a list of all eight exceptions, please see the chart listing relevant states' homestead exemptions in
Appendix A.
8 See FLA. CONST. art. X, 5 4(a) (limiting a creditor to foreclosing only "for the payment of
taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the purchase, improvement or repair
thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other labor performed on the realty"); see also, e.g.,
Morman, supra note 78, at 20 (cataloguing and examining various states' unlimited homestead
exemptions).
3 See IOWA CODE ANN. S 561.16 (West 2007) (exempting a resident's homestead from
judicial sale); IOWA CODE ANN. 5 624.23(2) (West 2007) (disallowing the attachment of liens to
homestead property). The Iowa Supreme Court interpreted these two statutes to protect the
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On the other hand, Oklahoma's unlimited homestead exemption
generally protects the homestead constitutionally and then specifically
reinforces this through statute.' Article XII, section 2 of Oklahoma's
Constitution tracks Florida's, only allowing a forced sale for purchase
money mortgages, state property tax liens, and mechanic's liens." Then,
through statute, the homestead is specifically limited in area to one acre in
urban areas and 160 acres in rural areas."
Oklahoma's unlimited homestead exemption is not as protective as
Florida's exemption.' In Oklahoma, ajudgment creditor may attach liens
to a debtor's homestead, and the creditor is only prevented from enforcing
those liens while the debtor holds the property as his homestead." Thus,
if the debtor seeks to alienate his homestead or severs the unities89 in a
tenancy by the entirety arrangement through divorce, the creditor may
enforce its lien that previously attached to the homestead property. 90
But uniquely, Kansas's constitutional homestead exemption only
denies unsecured creditors or judgment creditors the remedy of a forced
judicial sale.9 1 Under state law, a creditor may attach judicial liens but
homestead from both judicial sales and judicial liens. Baratta v. Polk County Health Servs. Inc., 588
N.W.2d 107, 110 (Iowa 1999). Thus, Iowa law only allows a judgment creditor to force a sale when
the state's statutes explicitly allow the creditor to do so. IOWA CODE ANN. 5 561.16 (West 2007).
4 OKIA. CONST. art. XII, S 2.
85 Id.
8 OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, S 2(a), (c) (West 2007); see In re Duncan, 107 B.R. 754, 757
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1988) (interpreting Oklahoma's homestead statute, title 31, section 2, as placing
no limit on the value a debtor may exempt for the allowable 160 acres of land in rural areas).
8 See Toma v. Toma, 163 P.3d 540, 542 n.1 (Okla. 2007) (finding that chapter 12, section
706(b) of Oklahoma law, passed in 1997, allows judgment liens to attach to a debtor's homestead
property, but the homestead is exempted from a forced judicial sale).
8 Id. In Toma, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that a judgment lien attached to the
debtor's homestead, but the creditor cannot recover due to the state's homestead exemption. The
court further held that the creditor could have recovered if the joint tenancy with a right to
survivorship was severed or if the debtor no longer used the property as his homestead. Id. at 546-47.
Unfortunately for the creditor, the debtor died and the property immediately vested in his wife. As a
joint tenant, she owned the undivided whole, and thus, the creditor never had a chance to extract the
debtor's interest from the property. Id.
8 See infra note 129 and accompanying text (explaining the unities required for property to be
held as a tenancy by the entirety.
9 See Laurence, supra note 69, at 476 (explaining that when the owners of a home divorce,
creditors may then enforce liens against the homestead).
9t Morman, supra note 78, at 20. Morman compares Article XV, Section 9 of the Kansas
Constitution, which denies a creditor the ability to force a judicial sale, with Kansas Statute Section
60-2202(a), which allows a judgment lien to attach to the debtor's residence in the county where the
property is located. Id.
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may not collect, analogous to Oklahoma.' In Arkansas, a married debtor,
or a debtor who is "head of a family,"' receives an unlimited exemption
for property less than a one acre but greater than a quarter acre in the city
and less than 160 acres but greater than 80 acres in the country.94 Finally,
the District of Columbia, through statute, changed its Homestead
Exemption from $16,150 to unlimited in 2001." In D.C., unsecured
creditors are denied the right to attach liens and to force sale of the
homestead.
The six states examined above have all opted out of the federal
exemptions located in section 522(d); thus, debtors in those states must
use state exemption laws. The District of Columbia has not opted out,
meaning its residents may use either federal or state exemptions.9 8  It
should also be noted that, based on the Supremacy Clause, federal tax
liens can attach to homestead property and be enforced by foreclosure
despite any state homestead exemption.' While homestead exemptions
generally provide needed protection to many, unlimited homestead
exemptions have several negative effects.'to Residents of states with high
9 See id.
9 "Head of family" implies one who cares for his or her children; that person may receive
homestead exemption protection even without being married. See Middleton v. Lockhart, 43 S.W.3d
113, 120 (Ark. 2001) (holding that anyone who is either married or the head of a household may
obtain a homestead exemption); see also Robert Laurence, Mobile Homesteads, and in Particular the Exempt
Status of Mobile Homes Located on Rented Lots: The Laws of Arkansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Utah
Compared and the Principle of the Liberal Construction of Exemption Statutes Analyzed, 57 ARK. L. REv. 221,
221 n.2 (2004) (explaining Arkansas's unlimited homestead exemption, and its disparate applications
as it relates to gender equality).
9 ARK. CONST. art. X, 5 3-5.
9 See In re McDonald, 279 B.R. 382, 384 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2002) (noting how the District of
Columbia broke from the federal homestead exemption limit, listed in 11 U.S.C. S 522(d)). D.C.
codified a statutory unlimited homestead exemption in 2001. See D.C. CODE ANN. 5 15-501(a)(14)
(LexisNexis 2001).
9 See D.C. CODE ANN. S 15-501(a)(14) (LexisNexis 2001). Under the D.C. Code,
homestead property, "is free and exempt from distraint, attachment, levy, or seizure and sale on
execution or decree of any court in the District of Columbia. .. ." Id. S 15-501(a) (emphasis added).
9 See Hynes et al., supra note 52, at 25-26 (listing the thirty-seven states that have opted out
of the federal exemptions located in section 522(d)).
9 See McDonald, 279 B.R. at 384 (noting that D.C. residents may elect either the District's
exemptions or the federally provided exemptions).
9 See United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 701 (1983).
1 See, e.g., supra note 19 and accompanying text (explaining that credit may not be available to
poorer residents because large state homestead exemptions shrink the credit supply, and explaining
that anytime a debtor defaults, an implicit bankruptcy tax is placed on all consumer loans because the
creditor must recoup lost revenue). But see Hynes & Posner, supra note 76, at 190 (citation omitted)
(arguing that large state exemptions are actually beneficial to low-income households because they
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homestead exemption caps whose incomes are in the upper fifty percent
have been found to have a higher demand for credit,o' while lower-
income borrowers in high exemption states hold less debt. 02 Thus,
"[h]ouseholds with large amounts of assets have the most to gain from
generous bankruptcy exemptions." 03 Large exemptions reduce the credit
available to low-income households because there is an overall reduction
in the credit supply."
Additionally, infamous millionaires, such as O.J. Simpson' and
former Enron CEO Kenneth Lay,o' have taken advantage of unlimited
state exemptions, even if they did not subsequently file for bankruptcy.0 7
In the wake of the Enron scandal, Kenneth Lay sold his lavish homes in
Colorado, but continued to hold onto a mansion in Texas.os In fact,
Congress specifically wrote one section of BAPCPA, section 52 2 (q), to
prevent executives, like Lay, from abusing state homestead exemptions. 0 9
The goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to give debtors a fresh start-not
a head start-toward solvency." 0  The Code should give debtors
exemptions to protect them from becoming destitute, but should not
allow debtors to abuse state exemptions."' It should not protect acts done
shrink the amount of credit available, preventing low-income debtors from borrowing beyond their
means and ending up in bankruptcy).




1os See Todd Zywicki, Bankrupt Criticisms, NAT'L REv. ONLINE, Mar. 15, 2005,
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/zywicki200503150744.asp (citing O.J. Simpson as having
moved to Florida to take advantage of the homestead exemption, and thus preventing the seizure of
his property that would go to pay the multi-million dollar civil judgment against him).
106 Lay, the former CEO of Enron, kept a $7.1 million house in Texas, while selling off $20
million in property located in Colorado. Philip Shenon, Enron's Many Strands: The Executives; Home as
Shield from Creditors Under Fire, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 2002, at C1. Colorado's homestead exemption is
limited to $60,000. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. S 38-41-201(1)(a) (West 2007).
107 See CharlesJ. Tabb, The Top Twenty Issues in the History of Consumer Bankruptcy, 2007 U. ILL.
L. REv. 9, 16 (2007) (citing Enron executives' use of Florida's and Texas's generous homestead
exemptions as part of the impetus for passing the homestead exemption-limiting provisions in
BAPCPA).
10 Shenon, supra note 106, at Cl.
10 See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 595 (2005) (stating that the limitations relating to securities
violations in section 522(q) were placed in BAPCPA as a response to Kenneth Lay's actions in the
wake of the Enron scandal).
no See Norwest Bank Neb. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 1988).
I" See id. (finding that the debtor fraudulently used annuities to prevent creditors from
recovering and denying the debtor his discharge).
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to preserve a lifestyle a debtor could not afford, while creditors are paid
pennies on the dollar.'12 Due to these, and many other egregious abuses
by high profile debtors,"' the homestead exemption has been under
criticism for many years." 4
Now that state homestead exemptions have been critically examined,
the other exemption, the tenancy by the entirety exemption, must be
discussed. This is a federal exemption based on the common law estate
and is significant because debtors must move to a state that allows
residents to hold property as tenants by the entirety if the debtor wants to
take advantage of the TBE Loophole." 5 Furthermore, as discussed in
detail below, the TBE Loophole allows a debtor to bypass BAPCPA's
homestead-restricting provisions, section 522(o), (p), and (q)."6 Thus,
the new provisions are completely ineffective at accomplishing their
purpose: preventing the abusive use of certain states' unlimited
homestead exemptions."' As a consequence, debtors remain free to take
advantage of certain states' unlimited homestead exemptions."'
112 If the Code gave a debtor the ability to preserve the lifestyle that led the debtor to file for
bankruptcy, it would be contrary to the Code's purpose and not a fresh start, but rather a head start.
See id. at 876.
113 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (listing debtors such as Bowie Kuhn, the former
commissioner of Major League Baseball, who have abused state homestead exemptions).
114 See NAT'L BANKR. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTiYYEARS § 1.2.2, at 125-26
(1997), available at http://govinfo.library.unit.edu/nrbc/report/05ccons.pdf (recommending that state
laws should govern the amount of the exemption which should be "not less than $20,000 and not
more than $100,000.").
us See supra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining that state law determines who may
hold property as tenants by the entirety).
116 See infra note 209 and accompanying text (explaining that since the debtor elected to
exempt his home under the TBE Exemption in section 522(b)(3)(B), section 522 (o), (p), and (q)
does not apply). The homestead exemption provision in the Code, section 522(b)(3)(A), specifically
states, "subject to subsections (o) and (p)"; this language is missing from the TBE Exemption, and
thus the new BAPCPA provisions do not apply. See 11 U.S.C. S 522(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2007). This
loophole may extend to property held as joint tenants, but that is beyond the scope of this article. See
id. S 522(b)(3)(B) (allowing the debtor to exempt any "interest [held] as a tenant by the entirety orjoint
tenant") (emphasis added).
117 The TBE Exemption allows the debtor to exempt "any interest in property in which the
debtor had . .. an interest as a tenant by the entirety . . .". Id. That, of course, includes the homestead.
See id.
11 The effect of the TBE Exemption and the TBE Loophole is that section 522(o), (p), and
(q) does not apply. This places a debtor that is attempting to exempt a homestead held as tenants by
the entirety in the exact same position he was in prior to the passage of BAPCPA. See supra note 116
and accompanying text (explaining that BAPCPA's homestead exemption-limiting restrictions do not
apply to any interest held as a tenant by the entirety).
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D. Tenancy by the Entirety Estate and the Procedural Opportunity Provided
by the Tenancy by the Entirety Exemption, Section 522(b) (3) (B)
Another significant federal exemption, the TBE Exemption, is found in
section 522(b)(3)(B) of the Code."' Any debtor residing in ajurisdiction
recognizing the tenancy by the entirety estate may use the TBE
Exemption.'20 The TBE Exemption is used frequently by debtors' 2 ' and,
as explained infra, may become more popular due to the restrictions
BAPCPA placed on debtors wishing to claim state homestead exemptions
in bankruptcy court through section 522(b)(3)(A), the Homestead
Provision.'" While the TBE Exemption is provided by the Code, its
availability and protections are based on the law of the state in which the
bankruptcy court sits." Thus, the TBE Exemption merely provides the
debtor with access to state law protections he would otherwise have if he
were in state court. Because state law dictates the substantive parameters
of the TBE Exemption, a brief examination of state tenancy by the
entirety law is necessary.
Married persons may hold real or personal property as tenants by the
entirety, which is a common law estate.'24 Thirty states and the District of
Columbia have laws governing tenancies by the entirety; among these are
Arkansas, Florida, and Oklahoma.'25 All three states and the District of
119 See 11 U.S.C. 5 522 (b)(3)(B) (2007).
120 See supra note 66 and accompanying text (finding that as long as the homestead property is
held as tenants by the entirety, it may be exempted pursuant to the TBE Exemption).
121 See, e.g., In re O'Lexa, 476 F.3d 177, 178 (3d Cir. 2007) (interpreting Pennsylvania's tenancy
by the entirety protections and allowing a debtor to exempt property pursuant to section
522(b)(3)(B)); Mathews v. Cohen, 382 B.R. 526, 528 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (deciding whether debtors
could exempt a stock certificate pursuant to section 522(b)(3)(B)); In re Hinton, 378 B.R. 371, 375 n.4
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (stating that the debtor exempted his Florida homestead pursuant to section
522 (b)(3)(B)).
122 This article demonstrates how a debtor can evade the new homestead exemption-limiting
provisions of BAPCPA. Once debtors realize they can evade the provisions, it obviously follows that
debtors who want to protect assets before filing for bankruptcy will use the TBE Loophole to do so.
See generally H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 592-93 (listing debtors who, in the past, have funneled assets
into an exempt homestead).
i23 See In re Brannon, 476 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2007) (examining and applying
Pennsylvania's tenancy by the entirety law to a bankruptcy case up on appeal).
124 7 RICHARD R POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY S 52.01[1] (Michael Allan Wolf ed.,
LexisNexis 2000); id. at 5 52.03[4].
125 Id. 5 52.01; see also Davies v. Johnson, 187 S.W. 323, 324 (Ark. 1916) (allowing Arkansas
residents to hold property as tenants by the entirety); Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assoc., 780 So. 2d
45, 52 (Fla. 2001) (allowing Florida residents to hold property as tenants by the entirety); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 60, S 74 (West 2007) (allowing Oklahoma residents to hold property as tenants by the
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Columbia have unlimited state homestead exemptions.126 Thus, as
explained in Part IV, a debtor in these four jurisdictions can take
advantage of the TBE Loophole.
State attitudes toward recognizing the tenancy by the entirety estate
vary widely.'27 Despite this fact, each state that does recognize it has
generally adopted the same requirements and restrictions. 128 For real
property to be held as tenants by the entirety, six attributes must be
present: 1) the owners are married; 2) each takes possession of the
property at the same time; 3) each has an equal interest; 4) each has equal
possession; 5) each has equal title in the property; and 6) both have the
right of survivorship.'29 Each spouse is considered vested with the entire
title of the property held. 30 In many states, when a married couple
purchases a home there is a presumption the couple purchased the home
as tenants by the entirety.' 3 ' Finally, holding property as tenants by the
entirety prevents either spouse from conveying his or her interest.13 2
The policy rationale behind the tenancy by the entirety estate is
similar to the policy rationale for homestead exemptions. Both seek to
preserve and protect the family home."' On the other hand, the
entirety); D.C. CODE ANN. S 19-501 (LexisNexis 2001) (recognizing the tenancy by the entirety
estate).
126 Hynes et al., supra note 52, at 25-26.
12 See supra note 125 and accompanying text (explaining that only thirty states allow residents
to hold property as tenants by the entirety); see also Beal Bank, 780 So. 2d at 48-49 (finding that when a
bank account is held in both spouses' names, a presumption arises that the bank account is held as
tenants by the entirety). Florida law allows personal property to be held as tenants by the entirety. Id.
at 54.
12s See, e.g., Weir v. Brigham, 236 S.W. 435, 437 (Ark. 1951) (stating that for property to be
held as tenants by the entirety "the unities of time, title, interest, and possession" must be present).
129 See, e.g., Beal Bank, 780 So. 2d at 52 (setting forth all the necessary elements for property to
be held as TBE property); 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husband and W4ife 5 18 (stating the required elements for
property to be held as TBE property).
130 Beal Bank, 780 So. 2d at 53.
131 See, e.g., Branch v. Polk, 33 S.W. 424, 424 (Ark. 1895) (holding that property jointly
conveyed to a husband and wife vests in them an estate in entirety); Morrison v. Potter, 764 A.2d 234,
237 (D.C. 2000) (holding that the "jurisdiction essentially employs a presumption that property,
including bank accounts, held by a husband and wife as joint tenants is held by the entireties, unless
proof of a contrary intent leads to a different result"); Beal Bank, 780 So. 2d at 58 (holding that as with
jointly held realty, jointly held bank accounts are entitled to a presumption in favor of the property
being held in the form of tenancy by the entireties property).
132 POWELL, supra note 124, at S 52.03[1].
133 Compare id. at 5 52.03[5] (noting that the purpose of the tenancy by the entirety estate is to
protect the home and the family) widh supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose of
the homestead exemption, among others, is to preserve freedom and independence for the family).
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protections the tenancy by the entirety estate provides, which this article
refers to as the "TBE Shield," are more circumscribed than the
protections offered by state homestead exemptions; and the protections
provided by homestead exemptions are qualitatively different from those
provided by the TBE Shield. First, the TBE Shield only protects the
"marital home and the familial benefits of dependent children."l 34
Conversely, state homestead exemptions may protect: 1) a marital
homestead; 2) a homestead owned by a single adult; 3) a homestead
owned by a single parent with marital children; or 4) a single parent with
non-marital children. 35
Second, the TBE Shield not only protects against the actions of
creditors, similar to the homestead exemption, but also protects against
the actions of the co-tenant. Tenants holding property as tenants by the
entirety may not convey or encumber the property "by the unilateral
act ... of either husband or wife.""' Third, depending upon the
applicable state law, the TBE Shield applies to more property than just the
homestead, such as joint bank accounts. 3 1
Finally, the TBE Shield only protects property from creditors so long
as only one of the spouses is liable to that creditor for that debt.38  Put
differently, if both spouses are liable to a creditor, there is a common debt;
then the creditor may reach past the TBE Shield.139  Due to this last
distinction, debtors are less likely to use the TBE Shield to protect the
home and would rather use the state unlimited homestead exemption,
which provides an absolute bar to unsecured creditors, preventing them
134 POWELL, supra note 124, at S 52.03[5].
135 Florida, Oklahoma, and D.C. provide all residents with the benefits of the homestead
exemption, whether single or married. FLA. CONST. art. X, S 4(a)(1); OKAL. CONST. art XII, 5 2;
D.C. CODEANN. S 15-501(a)(14) (LexisNexis 2001).
136 POWELL, supra note 124, at 5 52.03[1]. However, NewJersey allows a spouse to convey or
encumber his or her respective survivorship interests in property held as tenants by the entirety. See
id. 5 52.03[4] n.23 (referencing Cherry v. Cherry, 403 A.2d 45, 47-48 (N.J. Super. 1979).
137 See In re Schwarz, 362 B.R. 532, 534 n.2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding "[t]he range of
property so exempt under Florida law is extremely broad and encompasses far more than homestead
property alone").
1s See In re Kearns, 8 F.2d 437, 438 (4th Cir. 1925) ("[L]ands held by tenants by entirety
cannot be sold to satisfy judgments rendered alone against either tenant upon their separate
obligations..."); William G. Craig, Jr., An Analysis of Estates by the Entirety in Bankruptcy, 48 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 255, 258 (1974) (stating that creditors cannot collect against either spouses' right to
survivorship or the spouses' present interests). If a debtor holds joint debts with his spouse, creditors
of those joint debts may attach liens or bring actions in bankruptcy court against tenancy by the
entirety property. Vasilion v. Vasilion, 66 S.E.2d 599, 602 (Va. 1951).
139 Vasilion, 66 S.E.2d at 602.
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from reaching into the value of the home.'40 Now that the pertinent
exemptions have been explained, Congress's attempt to deter the abusive
use of certain states' unlimited homestead exemptions through the
passage of BAPCPA will be examined.
14 The states examined in this article, which are listed and summarized in Appendix A, allow
three types of creditors to collect against the homestead, despite homestead exemptions: 1) purchase
money mortagees; 2) state property tax creditors or federal tax creditors; and 3) creditors holding a
mechanic's lien. See Appendix A. And, as explained above, if the debts are held against both spouses,
creditors can reach past the TBE Shield, levying upon TBE property. See Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand
& Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 2001) ("However, when property is held as a tenancy by the
entireties, only the creditors of both the husband and wife, jointly, may attach the tenancy by the
entireties property; the property is not divisible on behalf of one spouse alone, and therefore it cannot
be reached to satisfy the obligation of only one spouse."); see also supra note 136 and accompanying text
(explaining that, with the exception of New Jersey, one spouse may not unilaterally encumber TBE
property). Thus, the TBE Shield provides no greater protection than state homestead exemptions
because it does not prevent the same three types of creditors from attaching liens to homestead
property. Purchase money mortgagees, if they have any advice from legal counsel, will hold the
mortgage against both spouses. State property tax debts apply to both spouses so long as both are
listed on the lien, and recently, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a federal tax lien held against only
one spouse reaches past the TBE Shield, attaching to TBE property. See infra notes 286-87 and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's Crafi decision); see generally Robert E. Parker, Inc.
v. Oklahoma er rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, No. 93-C-111-E, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4259, at *2,
*9-10 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 9, 1994) (noting that an Oklahoma sales tax warrant listing both spouses
names applied to the assets of both spouses). Finally, mechanic's liens apply to both spouses so long
as both are listed on the lien, and in some states, even where only one spouse is listed. See In re Kiser,
344 B.R. 423, 426-32 (W.D. Va. 2003) (finding that in Virginia a mechanic's lien listing only one
spouse is valid against TBE property and citing case law from Indiana and Missouri that supported the
Court's holding). Thus, these three types of debts are typically joint debts, and hence creditors can
collect on them despite the TBE Shield.
As just shown, the TBE Shield provides no greater protection than state homestead
exemptions, and in fact, the TBE Shield provides less protection. The TBE Shield provides less
protection than state homestead exemptions because state homestead exemptions prevent creditors
from attaching liens to homesteads when the lien is predicated upon any jointly held debt other than
the three listed above. E.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, S 4(a)(1); cf Robert E. Parker, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEIS
4259, at *8-9 (holding that the Oklahoma homestead exemption does not prevent attachment of liens
to homestead property but does prevent enforcement of those liens by foreclosure unless the liens fall
into one of the three categories listed above). The TBE Shield cannot protect homestead property
from other jointly held debts.
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III. THE PURPOSE AND LEGISLATiVE HISTORY FOR THE
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT OF 2005
Congress, after eight years of trying, successfully passed revisions to
the Bankruptcy Code in 2005.1' In passing BAPCPA, Congress sought to
curb the recent increases in bankruptcy filings, deter serial filings, and
increase consumer accountability.'42 Specific provisions of BAPCPA
sought to provide needed oversight to "eliminate abuse in the system. "143
Congress was concerned about the current state of the bankruptcy system
because when debtors receive discharges in bankruptcy, creditors pass
along some of the losses they absorb on to responsible consumers.'"
"Every phone bill, electric bill, mortgage, furniture purchase, medical bill,
and car loan contains an implicit bankruptcy 'tax' that the rest of us pay to
subsidize those who do not pay their bills." 4 5
The heart of BAPCPA is the "means test," which prevents certain
debtors from filing Chapter 7, forcing them to file Chapter 13.146 Another
major reform to the Code deals with capping the amount of "homestead
equity a debtor may shield from creditors... . Prior to BAPCPA,
debtors used exemption planning, and only in rare cases did the use of
exemptions rise to the level of an abuse and prevent the debtor from
receiving his discharge of debts.148  Congress felt there should be a more
141 H.R REP. No. 109-3 1, at 6 (2005).
142 Id. at 2.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
1s Id. (quoting prepared statement of Prof. Todd Zywicki at hearing before Senate
Committee on the Judiciary). No one knows exactly how the losses creditors absorb when debtors
file for bankruptcy affect lenders and consumers, but the discharge of debt certainly has some impact
on the economy. Id.
146 See H.R REP. No. 109-31, at 2 (2005). Congress "presume[d] abuse" of the Bankruptcy
Code if the debtor's monthly income over the future five years, deducting certain expenses, was over
$10,950. 11 U.S.C. S 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (2007). If the amount, which was the debtor's average monthly
income for the prior sixty months minus certain mandated expenses, was less than $6,575, the debtor
could file Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. Id. However, if the debtor was in between the two numbers and
the amount was greater than twenty-five percent of the debtor's unsecured debts, abuse was
presumed, and the debtor must file for Chapter 13. Id.
147 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2 (2005).
14 See Norwest Bank Neb. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding the debtor's
liquidation of his entire net worth, $700,000, and his conversion of it into exempt property on the eve
of bankruptcy constituted the fraudulent use of an unlimited exemption, which required the denial of
the debtor's discharge).
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substantial check on debtors when they use exemptions because it is
difficult for a creditor or trustee to persuade a bankruptcy court to deny a
debtor his discharge."' Additionally, the level at which exemption use
turns into abuse is fact-sensitive and difficult to determine with any
degree of certainty.so Congress specifically wanted to close the "mansion
loophole," which allowed debtors living in certain states to use their
homestead as a coffer for non-exempt funds, preventing creditors from
collecting on their claims.' Certain debtors, in the past, actually moved
to homestead-friendly states just to take advantage of the beneficial
exemption,152 and Congress wanted to prevent this abuse.'
Congress established a bright-line threshold for the state homestead
exemptions.1'5 Section 52 2 (p), enacted into law by BAPCPA, prevents the
149 The burden of proof for denying a discharge is steep for three reasons: First, some courts
require the party seeking a denial to provide clear and convincing evidence of fraud. In re Cutignola,
87 B.R. 702, 706 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re Wines, 114 B.R. 794, 796 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990)
(citation omitted). Second, at least for section 727(a)(2), the party seeking the denial must prove
fraudulent intent, a difficult task. See infra note 196 and accompanying text (explaining that direct
evidence of fraud is rare, and thus fraud is usually shown through circumstantial evidence). Finally, a
bankruptcy judge is likely to err on the side of the debtor in a close case because of the significant
impact a denial of discharge will have on the debtor. See In re Booth, 70 B.R. 391, 394 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1987); but see In re Keck, 363 B.R. 193, 212 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007) (denying the debtor a
discharge, under section 727(a)(2)(A), where the debtor made false statements under oath and
transferred property of the bankruptcy estate with the intent to defraud creditors).
150 Cf Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank in Brookings, 848 F.2d 866, 867-69 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding
the bankruptcy court's findings not clearly erroneous in granting discharge, when the debtor, just
prior to bankruptcy, sold approximately $30,000 of non-exempt property and placed the revenue from
the sale in exempt assets). But see Tveten, 848 F.2d at 876 (holding the debtor's actions of placing
almost his entire net worth into an exempt asset, which was out of the reach of creditors, was a
fraudulent use of exemptions and denying the debtor his discharge). Based on the foregoing cases,
one can see how hard it is to know for certain when the use of exemptions will result in the denial of
discharge.
For a discussion of bankruptcy planning under BAPCPA and the subsequent economic
effects of such actions see Michelle J. White, Abuse or Protection? Economics of Bankrutpcy Reform Under
BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 275, 291-92 (2007).
15 H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 15-16 (2005). One egregious example of abuse is when Marvin
Warner, a former U.S. ambassador to Switzerland, paid very little of the $4 billion in bankruptcy
claims he owed but retained a multi-million dollar horse ranch in Florida. Larry Rohter, Rich Debtors
Finding Shelter Under a Populist Florida Law, N.Y.TIMEs,July 25, 1993, at Al.
152 H.R REP. No. 109-31, at 16 (2005). According to the Republican Study Committee, "the
bill discourages debtors from moving to a state with more favorable homestead laws in order to keep
an expensive home after declaring bankruptcy." Rep. Mike Pence, Legislative Bulletin S. 256 BAPCPA,
REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM., Apr. 14, 2005, at 3.
15 H.R REP. No. 109-31, at 16 (2005).
'5 See 11 U.S.C. S 522(p)(1)(A) (2007) (allowing an exemption of up to $136,875 if the
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abusive use of state homestead exemptions by strictly limiting the amount
a creditor may exempt in his homestead.' Section 52 2 (p) caps the value
of homestead property a debtor may claim as exempt at $136,875,156 if that
property was exempted under state law and was acquired in the preceding
1,215 day period before the debtor filed for bankruptcy.'
BAPCPA provided other provisions that limit the use and abuse of
state homestead exemptions.' For example, section 522(o) allows a
creditor or the trustee to seek a reduction in the amount that may be
claimed as exempt to the extent the value is derived from fraudulently
transferred non-exempt property.159  Section 522(o) allows the trustee to
seek a reduction in the value of the debtor's homestead if the debtor: 1)
sold non-exempt assets; 2) with the intent to defraud creditors; 3) in the
previous ten years before filing for bankruptcy; and 4) the debtor funneled
those assets into the exempt homestead.'60 If all these elements are
present, the value that a debtor may exempt through the homestead
exemption can be reduced by up to the value of those non-exempt
assets.16 ' This reduction will enlarge the portion of the debtor's
bankruptcy estate that is not exempt, allowing unsecured creditors to
obtain a larger percentage of their claims.162
Finally, section 522 (q) prevents, among other things, a debtor from
exempting any amount over $136,875 if the debtor: 1) "has been
convicted of a felony . . . which under the circumstances, demonstrates
that the filing of the case was an abuse of the [Code]";16 2) owes a debt
debtor purchased the house within the 1,215 days prior to filing for bankruptcy). This amount
reflects "the change in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers." Id. S 104(b)(1).
155 Id. 5 522(p)(1)(A).
156 See sources cited infra note 203 (explaining how $136,875 became section 522(p)'s
threshold limit).
157 11 U.S.C. S 522(p)(1) (2007).
Is8 See id. S 522(o)-(q).
1' See id. S 522(o). For example, if a home was worth $3 million and the debtor purchased
the home with non-exempt funds amounting to $450,000, then the house would be sold if the trustee
could prove the debtor bought the home with the intent to defraud creditors. If the court approved a
sale, the proceeds of the sale, $3 million minus $450,000, go into the bankruptcy estate, leaving the
debtor with $2,550,000 in exempt assets and providing the creditors with $450,000 for distribution.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 The proceeds would be considered non-exempt assets and would go to paying unsecured
creditors after all the priority claims were paid out. Cf WARREN & BUSSEL, supra note 23, at 509
(explaining that the proceeds from the liquidation of non-exempt assets go to unsecured creditors, but
in most Chapter 7 cases, there are no non-exempt assets available).
16 11 U.S.C. 5 522(q)(1)(A) (2007).
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because of a violation of the Federal Securities laws; 3) owes a debt
because the debtor perpetrated a fraud while acting as fiduciary; or 4)
owes a debt because the debtor committed a criminal act or intentional
tort that caused serious injury in the previous five years." A short
overview of the pertinent BAPCPA provisions is found in Appendix B.
Congress passed section 522(o), (p), and (q) to prevent debtors from
moving to states with larger homestead exemptions and abusing the
Code.' Despite this intent, some members of Congress, at the time of
BAPCPA's passage, felt the new homestead exemption-limiting
provisions were ineffective in achieving their goal of preventing
homestead exemption abuse."' Others complained in the House Report
on BAPCPA that it does not prevent states from opting out of the federal
exemptions, and the law did not place an absolute dollar amount on state
homestead exemptions claimed in bankruptcy court.167
Finally, seven dissenting members of Congress observed that
"[w]ealthy debtors who are able to afford skillful legal advice, and are
sophisticated enough to engage in complex pre-bankruptcy planning, will,
in many cases, will [sic] be able to evade the paltry restriction in this
bill."'" Elaborating, they stated that
164 Id. S 522(q)(1).
165 See, e.g., In re Reinhard, 377 B.R. 315, 321 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2007) (finding that Congress
intended to prevent debtors from fleeing, on the eve of bankruptcy, to a state with a more "generous"
homestead exemption); In re Sissom, 366 B.R. 677, 678 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (explaining how,
prior to BAPCPA, Texas courts allowed debtors to funnel non-exempt assets into their exempt
homestead, paying down their mortgages, but through BAPCPA, Congress "put the brakes" on this
practice) (quoting In re Maronde, 332 B.R. 593, 598 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005)); In re Kaplan, 331 B.R.
483, 487 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) (stating, in the heading of an opinion, "[tlhe Legislative History is
Clear-Congress Intended to Limit the Homestead Exemption in Florida").
166 See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 375 (2005) (dissenting views of Representatives Conyers,
Berman, Nadler, Scott, Watt, Lofgren, Lee, Waters, Meehan, Delahunt, Weiner, Sanchez, and Van
Hollen). These members of Congress asserted that BAPCPA would not, "repeal or even cap
homestead ... exemption." Id.
167 Id. at 593. In addition, the Congressmen noted that BAPCPA allows debtors to roll over
equity from one house to another in the same state; section 522(p)(1)(B) allows an unlimited rollover
within the same state. Tabb, supra note 107, at 16. For example, if a debtor has lived in Texas for
twelve years and owns, outright, a $400,000 home, the debtor may then sell the $400,000 home and
use that money to purchase a $2 million home. The new home will not be subject to section
522(p)(1)(A), which strictly limits the homestead exemption to $136,875 or less. See 11 U.S.C. 5
522(p)(1)(B) (2007) (allowing a debtor to exclude any interest transferred from the debtor's previous
residence into the debtor's current residence as long as the debtor lived in the same state for more
than 1,215 days).
168 H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 595 (2005).
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[t]here are provisions [in BAPCPA] that will make Chapter 13
impossible for many of the debtors who would file today,
provisions that make it easier than ever to abuse the unlimited
homestead provisions in some states and yet at the same time hurt
people with more modest homesteads in those same states."
With section 522(o), (p), and (q) of BAPCPA sufficiently examined, this
article will demonstrate how debtors evade BAPCPA's homestead
exemption-limiting provisions, just as these seven Congressmen
presciently predicted.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT "TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY
LOOPHOLE"
Just as many members of Congress feared, there exists a large
loophole that renders section 522(o), (p), and (q) null and void in exactly
those states where Congress intended to prevent debtor abuses.' As
explained below, if the debtor possesses certain characteristics, he or she
will be able to evade the purview of section 522(o), (p) and (q). The next
part will present a hypothetical situation explaining how a debtor can take
advantage of the TBE Loophole if the debtor moved to Florida.
Following the hypothetical, the loophole's applicability in other
jurisdictions will be examined.
A. An Explanation and Application of the "Tenancy by the Entirety
Loophole"
Simply stated, so long as the debtor does not elect the Code's
Homestead Provision, section 522(b)(3)(A), when he exempts his
homestead in bankruptcy, but instead uses the TBE Exemption, section
522(b)(3)(B), none of BAPCPA's homestead exemption-limiting
provisions apply."' The following hypothetical makes it easy for the
debtor to claim the homestead as exempt under state law; Florida has the
169 Background on Bankruptq Revisions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on theJudiciary, 109th Cong.
230 (2005) (statement of Prof Elizabeth Warren, Harvard Law School).
170 See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 595 (2005) (asserting that it was just a matter of time before
wealthy debtors began taking advantage of Congress's poor drafting of the homestead provisions in
BAPCPA).
17 See 11 U.S.C. S 522(b)(3)(A) (2007) (allowing a debtor to exempt homestead property
"subject to subsections (o) and (p)"). However, in the very next exemption the debtor may use the
TBE Exemption, and there is no mention of subsections (o) or (p) applying Id. 5 522(b)(3)(B).
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most liberal unlimited homestead exemption.172 Additionally, the
hypothetical makes it difficult for a court to deny the debtor a discharge
pursuant to section 727(a) because, in the end, section 727(a) is the only
true hurdle left that the debtor must overcome to retain his lavish
homestead while simultaneously discharging his debts."
In 2004, John C. Caro realizes his hardware stores are not faring well,
and the corporation he operates, which owns twenty hardware stores, is
insolvent as of February 2005.174 Mr. Caro lives in Virginia and married in
1995."s Mr. Caro's wife is a school teacher who receives her own salary.
After speaking with a bankruptcy attorney, Mr. Caro decides to shut
down the corporation's five least profitable stores, selling the land,
fixtures, and inventory associated with those stores.17 ' This sale nets the
corporation $2.5 million. Mr. Caro uses $1 million to reinvest in the
other fifteen stores, which are still struggling. Then, in October 2005, he
sells his Virginia home for $450,000. Two months later, he buys a $2
million home in Boca Raton, Florida. This new home is titled in both his
and his wife's name. Mr. Caro pays for this home by spending $50,000 of
his savings, borrowing $1.5 million from the hardware corporation, and
providing the $450,000 he received from the sale of his previous home.
Thus, Mr. Caro paid for the home up front. All creditors of the
corporation were aware of the liquidation of the five stores, along with the
funds the sale generated. Additionally, Mr. Caro does not provide the
corporation with any collateral for the loan, and he subsequently fails to
make any of the scheduled monthly payments to the corporation for the
loan. In December 2005, Mr. Caro relocates his family to Florida.
172 Florida's homestead exemption is the most liberal because it is the only exemption that explicitly
allows debtors to use the exemption as a means to defraud their creditors. See Havoco ofAm., Ltd. v. Hill, 790
So. 2d 1018, 1030 (Fla. 2001) (holding that Florida's unlimited constitutional homestead exemption prevents
creditors from attaching liens to homestead property even if the homestead was "acquired by a debtor with the
specific intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors").
1 While the debtor may be able to evade BAPCPA's new homestead exemption-limiting
provisions, a bankruptcy court can still deny him his discharge if the debtor defrauded his creditors.
11 U.S.C. 5 727(a)(2) (2007).
174 This hypothetical is based on a Middle District of Florida Bankruptcy case, In re Hinton.
Seegenerally In re Hinton, 378 B.R 371 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007).
175 Virginia is used as the initial place of residence because Virginia's homestead exemption is
the Nation's lowest, only $5,000, with an additional $500 exemption for each member of the
household. VA. CODE ANN. 5 34-4 (LexisNexis 2005).
176 The Debtor could make only two sales and funnel the money from the first sale directly
into the new homestead. But the hypothetical has three distinct sales so the transactions look less
fraudulent, making it harder for the trustee or a creditor to argue to the bankruptcy court that it
should, pursuant to section 727(a), deny the debtor his discharge.
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While the initial influx of $1 million helped the remaining 15 stores,
the corporation still operates at a loss; and in October 2005, Mr. Caro
shuts down another five stores, selling the assets off for $2 million and
reinvesting all the money in the remaining hardware stores. Despite Mr.
Caro's efforts, the corporation's debts balloon, and the final ten stores
continue to perform at a loss. This forces Mr. Caro to sell off five more
stores in June 2006. With the five remaining stores making a profit in
June 2006, Mr. Caro begins to pay down the corporation's large debts,
which are approximately $14 million. Notwithstanding these efforts, in
January 2007, creditors bring suit against the corporation and Mr. Caro
personally. The creditors allege that the corporation is a sham and seek to
pierce the corporate veil, holding Mr. Caro personally liable for the
corporation's debts.
As of February 2007 the hardware corporation is insolvent, but the
five remaining stores return a profit until July 2007. In the winter of
2007, the corporation is unable to operate. The housing market collapses
and the hardware stores feel the effects. The creditors have won their
lawsuits and hold judgments against Mr. Caro. As the sole stockholder,
Mr. Caro was heavily invested in the corporation that owns the stores.
And in December 2007, he becomes insolvent. Then in January 2008,
both the corporation and Mr. Caro file for bankruptcy. Mr. Caro has no
joint debts with his wife; the Florida home does not have any outstanding
mortgages, and in his bankruptcy petition, he claims the house in Boca
Raton exempt pursuant to section 522(b)(3)(B), the TBE Exemption.
The bankruptcy court then orders a liquidation of the corporation. This
sale produces $4 million, but the corporation's unsecured debts total $16
million.
In this hypothetical the trustee, or a creditor, would attempt to obtain
the $1.5 million Mr. Caro "borrowed" from the corporation.'? Using
Code provisions, the trustee would argue the "loan" was fraudulent as to
the corporation, and Mr. Caro never intended to pay the corporation
back.17 ' The trustee for the corporation, or creditors of the corporation,
m7 The transfer of $1.5 million represents the trustee's or the creditors' best chance to recover
money from the exempt homestead. The money belongs to the corporation and was misappropriated
by the CEO. Further, as explained below, more badges of fraud are present in this transfer than in
any other.
17 Hinton, 378 B.R. at 375. In Hinton, the trustee brought a suit against the debtor under
section 522(o). Id. The trustee sought to extract money from the debtor's $1.6 million homestead
based on allegations that the debtor fraudulently transferred non-exempt assets into the exempt
homestead. Id. at 374-75; see also In re Sholdan, 217 F.3d 1006, 1010-11 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming the
lower court's finding that the debtor fraudulently funneled non-exempt assets into his exempt
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will first look to the Code for relief, specifically section 548, which covers
"fraudulent transfers and obligations.""' Section 548 allows the trustee
to, "avoid any transfer. . . of an interest of the debtor in property ....
If the trustee satisfies any subsection of section 548, the trustee may
"avoid" the transfer. This means the transfer is voided, and the asset or
assets fraudulently transferred are pulled back into the bankruptcy estate
for distribution to creditors.'"'
The trustee would prevail under section 548(a)(1)(B)(i),tu which
prevents constructively fraudulent transfers, and then the trustee would
extract $1.5 million from Mr. Caro's bankruptcy estate and place that
money into the corporation's bankruptcy estate, assuming Mr. Caro
possesses $1.5 million in non-exempt assets. However, section 548 only
provides a two year look-back period, or statute of limitations, and thus is
inapplicable." Next, the trustee will look to state law for help in reaching
the $1.5 million, using section 544(b), a strong-arm provision." Section
homestead in an action brought by the trustee to recover $162,000 in liquidated assets).
17 11 U.S.C. S 548 (2007).
to Id. 5 548(a)(1).
m81 See WARREN & BUSSEL, supra note 23, at 406 (explaining that a properly avoided transfer is
returned to the bankruptcy estate for distribution).
1 See 11 U.S.C. S 548(a)(1)(B) (2007) (allowing the trustee to avoid transfers if: 1) the debtor
voluntarily or involuntarily "received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange" for the
transfer; and 2) the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer). In the hypothetical, the
corporation was insolvent when Mr. Caro received the $1.5 million "loan." Mr. Caro did not give the
corporation a reasonably equivalent exchange. In fact, he did not give the debtor anything in
consideration for the loan and made no scheduled payments on the loan.
One can also argue, if the look-back period was longer than two years, that the trustee
would prevail under section 548(a)(1)(A) as well. Section 548(a)(1)(A) allows the trustee to recover a
transfer made with the, "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was
or became . . . indebted." Id. 5 548(a)(1)(A). Courts determine intent by looking to the badges of
fraud, and if any badges are present, they go to prove fraudulent intent. WARREN & BUSSEL, supra
note 23, at 407. Of the recognized badges of fraud, three are present in this hypothetical: "1) insider
relationships between the parties; 2) the lack or inadequacy of consideration for the transfer; and 3)
the financial condition of the party sought to be charged both before and after the transaction at
issue." See id. (citing Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601) and listing a
total of seven badges of fraud). First, Mr. Caro, the CEO, took the debtor's money; second, he did
not give any consideration for the $1.5 million transfer; and third, the corporation was insolvent
before the transfer. The trustee would prevail but for the short two year look-back period.
183 See 11 U.S.C. 5 548(a)(1) (2007) (giving the trustee the right to avoid a transfer that "was
made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition . . ."). Technically,
in the hypothetical, there are two transfers: 1) the transfer from the corporation to Mr. Caro; and 2)
Mr. Caro taking the proceeds of the transfer and using those funds to purchase the Florida
homestead.
' See id. S 544(b).
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544(b) is called a strong-arm provision because it gives the trustee the
opportunity to step into the shoes of any actual unsecured creditor and
use any state law an unsecured creditor could use."' In this hypothetical
situation, pursuant to section 544(b), the trustee would bring an action
under the applicable state law, Florida's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
("FUFTA"), Florida Statute Section 726.105.'"
If the trustee uses FUFTA, it will provide the trustee with a four-year
look-back period, or if the fraudulent transfer could not have been
discovered during those four years, a one-year look-back period after the
transfer was or could reasonably have been discovered by the creditor.17
Unfortunately for the trustee, FUFTA, which extends the look-back
period another two years, is superseded by Florida's constitutional
homestead exemption and cannot assist the trustee."' Florida law denies
recovery because of the state's expansive and liberal constitutional
homestead exemption.' 9  Interpreting that provision, the Florida
Supreme Court, in Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hill, ruled that unsecured
creditors are absolutely barred from bringing suit against the
homestead.'" Florida is the only state that explicitly protects debtors
when they fraudulently transfer non-exempt assets into the exempt
homestead, and Florida law does so regardless of how the debtor acquired
the non-exempt assets.'
185 See In re Image Worldwide, Ltd., 139 F.3d 574, 576-77 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the
trustee may use the strong-arm provision, 11 U.S.C. S 544(b) of the Code, to avoid any transaction
that an actual unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law).
' FLA. STAT. ANN. S 726.105 (West 2007). Section 726.105 provides that a transfer is
fraudulent if it is made with the
(a) actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor, or (b) [w]ithout receiving a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor: 1. Was
engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the
debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or 2. Intended to incur,
or believed or reasonably should have believed that he or she would incur, debts beyond his or her
ability to pay as they became due.
Id. 5 726.105(1). A creditor may attach a lien upon property or funds that were fraudulently
transferred. And if the creditor has obtained judgment on a claim, he may seek execution; that is, he
may have a court avoid the transfer. Id. 5 726.108.
19 Id. S 726.110.
188 See Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018, 1029 (Fla. 2001) (holding that Florida's
constitutional homestead exemption trumps any statutory law).
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 See generally Laurence, supra note 69, at 504 (discussing Havoco and whether the Arkansas
Supreme Court would hold similarly).
CALLING ALL DEBTORS
Because of yet another dead end, the trustee will look to the newly
passed BAPCPA homestead exemption-limiting provisions in section
522(o), (p), and (q), which are applied below to the hypothetical situation,
beginning with section 522(o)(4), followed by a detailed explanation of
why these provisions are inapplicable, and thus de facto nullified.
First, section 522(o) voids the fraudulent transfer of assets into the
homestead and has a ten-year look-back period.'" Section 522(o)(4) will
assist the trustee in this hypothetical situation, and in fact, this situation is
one Congress had in mind when it passed BAPCPA.1 93 For the trustee to
satisfy section 522(o)(4), he will have to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, four elements:
(1) the debtor disposed of property within 10 years preceding the
bankruptcy filing; (2) the property that the debtor disposed of was
non-exempt; (3) some of the proceeds from the sale of the
nonexempt property were used to buy a new homestead. . .; and
(4) the debtor disposed of the nonexempt property with the intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.194
Here, in Mr. Caro's case, all four elements are satisfied.
First, the corporation loaned Mr. Caro $1.5 million a little over two
years prior to the corporation filing for bankruptcy, which is well within
the ten-year look-back period. Second, Mr. Caro received the money
through the liquidation of corporate assets, which belonged to the
corporation also in bankruptcy and, thus, were not exempt. These assets
belonged in the corporation's bankruptcy estate; consequently, the money
is not exempt. Third, Mr. Caro used the $1.5 million to buy his home in
19 See 11 U.S.C. S 522(o) (2007).
9 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 16 (2005) (explaining how Congress intended to prevent debtors
from placing assets beyond the reach of creditors through the purchase of large homesteads).
For example, section 522(o) would have provided the trustee in this situation with a ten-
year look-back period. See 11 U.S.C. S 522(o) (2007). And if within this ten-year period the debtor
funneled non-exempt funds into his homestead with the "intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a
creditor," the trustee can reduce the value of the homestead to the extent that the homestead's value
was attributable to those non-exempt funds. Id.; see also In re Sissom, 366 B.R. 677, 693-701 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2007) (holding that the trustee could recover $50,000 of non-exempt money the debtor
used to purchase his homestead because eleven of the thirteen badges of fraud were present, signaling
the debtor's intent to defraud his creditors); In re Keck, 363 B.R. 193, 212 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007)
(finding that the debtor's homestead shall be reduced by $15,972.79 because the debtor funneled non-
exempt assets into his exempt homestead within one-year of filing for bankruptcy).
194 Sissom, 366 B.R. at 688-89.
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Florida. Fourth, because "direct evidence of [fraudulent intent] is rare," 95
the trustee would look to the "badges of fraud" as recognized in the state
where the court sits."' "Badges of fraud represent nothing more than a
list of circumstantial factors that a court may use to infer fraudulent
intent."'" Florida law recognizes that the presence of one badge of fraud
presents only a suspicious circumstance, but several of them together
present the circumstances from which one can infer fraudulent intent.9 '
The hypothetical presents three badges of fraud. First, the $1.5
million transfer was to a corporate insider because Mr. Caro was the CEO
of the bankrupt corporation. Second, Mr. Caro, the transferee, provided
no consideration to the corporation for the transfer. And third, the
transferor, the bankrupt corporation, was insolvent prior to the $1.5
million loan.'" Because Mr. Caro then transferred the $1.5 million into
his exempt homestead, the bankruptcy court would reduce Mr. Caro's
homestead pursuant to section 522(o)(4), selling the home through a
195 See In re Sholdan, 217 F.3d 1006, 1009-10 (8th Cir. 2000) ("It is elementary that showing
the presence of 'badges of fraud' continues to be a means of establishing intent to delay, hinder or
defraud creditors.") (citation omitted).
196 See, e.g., Sissom, 366 B.R. at 692 n.3 (finding that "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud"
is not usually proven through direct testimony but rather established through badges of fraud
recognized by the respective state in which the bankruptcy court sits); In re Maronde, 332 B.R. 593,
600 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005) (holding that the "presence of several or more 'badges of fraud' gives rise
to a presumption of fraudulent intent") (citation omitted).
197 Sholdan, 217 F.3d at 1009.
198 Johnson v. Dowell, 592 So. 2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Florida's badges of fraud
are listed below:
In determining actual intent under paragraph (1)(a), consideration may be given, among other
factors, to whether:
(a) The transfer or obligation was to an insider.
(b) The debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer.
(c) The transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed.
(d) Before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or
threatened with suit.
(e) The transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets.
(f) The debtor absconded.
(g) The debtor removed or concealed assets.
(h) The value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the
value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred.
(i) The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred.
(j) The transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred.
(k) The debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the
assets to an insider of the debtor.
FLA. STAT. ANN. S 726.105(2) (West 2007).
199 As stated in the hypothetical, the corporation's debts were greater than its assets.
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foreclosure sale and the corporation's bankruptcy estate would receive
$1.5 million of the proceeds from the sale.20
If, for some reason, the trustee did not prevail under section 522(o),
perhaps due to difficulty in proving fraudulent intent, another homestead
exemption-limiting provision would be available to the trustee. As
previously explained, section 522 (p)(1)(A) strictly caps the amount a
debtor may exempt, as his homestead, within 1,215 days before the debtor
files for bankruptcy.2 0 1 Mr. Caro purchased the new home less than 800
days before filing for bankruptcy, well within in the 1,215 day period.202
Mr. Caro's home is worth $2 million, which far exceeds the strict limit of
$136,875 provided by section 522(p)(1). 203 Thus, the homestead would be
sold and only $136,875 of the proceeds would be exempt within Mr.
Caro's bankruptcy estate.
Finally, the trustee can look to section 522(q)(1)(B)(ii). Section
522(q)(1)(B)(ii) prevents a debtor from exempting non-exempt assets that
were funneled at any times into the exempt homestead if: 1) the
200 See Sissom, 366 B.R. at 714 (holding that creditors or trustees who satisfy the elements of
section 522(o) may force debtors to lose their homes through foreclosure sales). The trustee in Sissom
satisfied the elements of section 522(o), and the court provided the trustee with an order allowing the
trustee to foreclose on the debtor's property. Id. at 714-15.
201 See infra note 204 and accompanying text (arguing that section 5 2 2 (p)'s look-back period of 1,215
days does not apply to section 52 2 (q)).
2' See 11 U.S.C. 5 522(p)(1)(A) (2007). Mr. Caro bought the Florida home in December
2005 and filed for bankruptcy less than 800 days later, in January 2008.
203 Id. This amount was initially set at $125,000, and according to section 104(b)(1), the
Judicial Conference of the United States shall set a new threshold amount, "to reflect the change in
the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers." Id. S 104(a)(1); see In re Larson, 513 F.3d 325,
328 n.2 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding that the prior threshold amount of $125,000 applies because the case
was filed before the adjusted amount took effect). The value changed again in March 2010.
ELIZABETH WARREN, BANKRUPTCY AND ARTICLE 9: STATUTORY SUPPLEMENT, 309 n.1 (2007).
204 See In re Cleaver, 407 B.R. 354, 357 (BAP. 8th Cir. 2009) ("Section 522(p) places a ceiling
on debtors' state law homestead exemptions, where the debtor acquired the homestead within 1,215
days of the petition, and section 52 2 (q) limits the homestead exemption based on certain illegal or
unlawful conduct."); In re Presto, 376 B.R. 554, 591-93 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (interpreting section
522(q)(l)(B)(ii) as requiring the trustee or a creditor to prove only two elements in order to exclude an
interest from homestead exemption protection: 1) the debtor owed someone or something a fiduciary
duty; and 2) the debtor "committed fraud, deceit, or manipulation while acting in this fiduciary
capacity"); Lawrence R Ahern, III, Homestead and Other Exmptions Under the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act: Observations on 'Asset Protection' After 2005, 13 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 585, 597 (2005) (explaining that section 522(q) applies "regardless of when the property was
acquired"). But see In re Burns, 395 B.R. 756, 762-63 (Bank. M.D. Fla. 2008) (reading section 522(q)
as incorporating section 522(p)'s threshold requirements, specifically section 522(p)'s 1,215 day look-
back period). The Court in Burns held that, in addition to section 522(q)'s $136,875 floor and the two
elements listed in Presto, the homestead interest at issue could be found non-exempt under section
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homestead is worth over $136,875;20s 2) the debtor owes someone, or
something, a fiduciary obligation; and 3) the debtor, "commit[s] fraud,
deceit, or manipulation while acting in that fiduciary capacity.n 206 Again,
Mr. Caro's home is worth more than $136,875. Further, Mr. Caro, as a
corporate director, owes the corporation he worked for a fiduciary duty.207
52 2 (q) only if the interest was acquired within the 1,215 day period prior to the debtor filing for
bankruptcy. Id.
Congress's poor drafting of section 5 2 2 (p) and (q) creates an ambiguity and allows for the
two competing interpretations explained above. The ambiguity exists because section 522(q) states
that as a result of electing the Code's Homestead Provision, section 522(b)(3)(A), "a debtor may not
exempt any amount of interest in property described in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D) ofsubsection
(p)(1)" that exceeds, in the aggregate, $136,875. 11 U.S.C. 5 52 2 (q) (2007) (emphasis added). The
author, based on legislative history and the cases cited above, reads the quoted language as meaning
that section 522(q) applies to the property described in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D)-that is,
the reference to the language of section 52 2 (p)(1) is merely definitional and does not incorporate the
1,215 day look-back period of section 522(p)(1). See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 595 (explaining the
mechanics and deficiencies of section 522 (o), (p), and (q) and stating that section 52 2(p) applies to
the 1,215 days prior to the debtor filing for bankruptcy but leaving out any mention of the 1,215 day
period applying to section 52 2 (q)). Additionally, if Congress meant to incorporate the 1,215 day look-
back period of section 52 2 (p)(1) to section 522(q), it could have written, "property described in
subsection 522(p)(1)," in place of the cumbersome language it used-"any amount of interest in
property described in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D) of subsection (p)(1)." 11 U.S.C. S 522(q)
(2007). This would have been far simpler and more concise than section 522(q)'s current language.
Id. However, Congress did not use this simpler language, and this tends to prove that Congress
referenced only the subparagraphs of section 522(p)(1) and did not want to incorporate the look-back
restriction. Indeed, the courts in Cleaver and Presto do not incorporate the 1,215 day look-back period
of section 52 2 (p)(1), for the look-back period is not mentioned anywhere in the courts' analysis of
section 522(q). See Presto, 376 BR. at 591-93; Cleaver, 407 B.R. at 357. That said, in Presto, the
transfer of interest sought to be held non-exempt under section 522(q) took place within 1,215 days
before the bankruptcy petition was filed, and thus Presto is consistent with the Middle District of
Florida's interpretation in Burns. Presto, 376 B.R. at 574. Finally, from a logical standpoint, if
Congress intended to incorporate the 1,215 day look-back period of section 522(p)(1) to section
522(q), section 52 2 (q) would have almost no effect or restrictive power over a debtor's activities.
Section 522(q) would be surplusage because section 522(p)(1) disallows the exempting of any interest
over $136,875 in the homestead that is acquired during the 1,215 day period before the filing of the
petition for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. 5 522(p)(1) (2007). Creditors would not take it upon themselves
to prove the additional elements section 522(q)(1)(A) or (B) require when section 522(p)(1) does not
require the showing of any additional elements. Section 522(q), as read by the court in Burns, is
rendered superfluous, and, "statutes should be construed 'so as to avoid rendering superfluous' any
statutory language." YULE KIM, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT
TRENDS, CRS REP. 97-589, at 12 (2008) available at http-//www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf.
M See 11 U.S.C. S 522(q)(1) (2007) (stating that the debtor can keep up to $136,875 of the
homestead and the subsequent provisions only apply to an amount greater than $136,875).
206 Presto, 376 B.R. at 592-93.
W7 See id. at 593 n.42 (noting that not only do corporate directors "have fiduciary obligations"
but spousal relationships may also qualify for protection under section 522(q)(1)(B)(ii)).
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And by borrowing corporate funds and using those funds to purchase a
home, Mr. Caro-at the very least-manipulated the corporation for his
benefit while acting as its sole director. 0 8 Thus, under section
522(q)(1)(B)(ii), the trustee could reduce the homestead's value by $1.5
million.
Unfortunately, the trustee will not be able to use sections 522(o)(4),
522(p)(1)(A), or 522(q)(1)(B)(ii) because Mr. Caro elected to claim his
house pursuant to the TBE Exemption. Therefore, section 522(o), (p),
and (q) simply does not apply. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Middle District of Florida in In re Hinton stated that "[s]ection 522(o),
however, only applies to subsection (A) of [s]ection 522(b)(3), and not to
subsection (B)." 2 " Put differently, section 522(b)(3)(A) specifically states
that "[p]roperty listed in this paragraph is . . . subject to subsections (o)
and (p),"210 but section 522(b)(3)(B) does not so state.21' The clause,
"subject to subsections (o) and (p)," is strikingly absent from section
522(b)(3)(B).212 Indeed, each newly enacted homestead exemption-
limiting provision of BAPCPA reinforces the court's interpretation that
section 522(o), (p), and (q) only applies to property exempted under
section 522(b)(3)(A), the Code's Homestead Provision. Section 522(o)
states "[for the purposes of subsection (b)(3)(A)"; section 522 (p) states,
"as a result of electing under subsection (b)(3)(A) to exempt property
under State or local law"; and section 522(q) states, "[a]s a result of
208 Cf Golden Pacific Bancorp v. FDIC, 273 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that unjust
enrichment constitutes a breach of a fiduciary obligation).
20 In re Hinton, 378 B.R. 371, 380 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (emphasis added); e.g., In re
Buonopane, 359 B.R. 346, 347 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (concluding from the plain language of
section 522(p)(1) that it does not apply to the tenancy by the entirety exemption of section
522(b)(3)(B)); In re Schwarz, 362 B.R. 532, 534 n.2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (explaining in dicta that
although Congress, in BAPCPA, significantly reformed the Homestead Provision in section
522(b)(3)(A) by adding section 522(o), (p), and (q), "Congress determined to leave wholly intact the
preexisting blanket exemption available to debtors who own property in a tenancy by the entireties
form if applicable nonbankruptcy law would exempt that property from process"); Judith K
Fitzgerald, We All Live in a Yellow Submarine: BAPCPA's Impact on Family Law Matters, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J.
563, 580 (2007) (surveying BAPCPA's changes to the exemption provisions of the Code and noting
how the new homestead provisions "could affect the allowable exemptions" and then noting no
change for property exempted if held as tenants by the entirety); Paul M. Hoffmann & Jerald S.
Enslein, Overview of Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 62 Mo. BAR 300,
303 (Oct. 2006) (finding that "BAPCPA does not change the exemption available in Missouri for real
and personal property held by a husband and wife as tenants by the entireties").
210 11 U.S.C. S 522(b)(3)(A) (2007).
211 Compare id. wid d. 5522(b)(3)(B).
212 See id. S 522(b)(3)(B).
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electing under subsection (b)(3)(A) to exempt property under State or
local law."2 13 Finally, as stated above in section 522(p)(1), a debtor may
elect either exemption.214
The trustee can look, in vain, to the Code's TBE Exemption to
attempt to recover the $1.5 million Mr. Caro invested in his homestead.
The TBE Exemption allows a debtor to exempt property held as tenancy
by the entirety prior to filing for bankruptcy "to the extent that such
interest as a tenant by the entirety ... is exempt from process under
applicable nonbankruptcy law . ... "'25 "Nonbankrutpcy law" is a term of
art within the Code, meaning the applicable state law.216 In Florida, a
home purchased in both spouses' names is presumptively held as a
tenancy by the entirety.2 17 Thus, it would be hard for the trustee to argue
that Mr. Caro does not own the home as a tenant by the entirety, in an
attempt to prevent him from claiming the TBE Exemption because Mr.
Caro has been married for over ten years, and both spouses' names appear
on the title. Thus, the home is presumptively held as tenants by the
entirety.
The trustee and unsecured creditors can look to local law for a cause
of action to bring against the homestead.2 18 But as explained above,
Florida's constitutional homestead exemption denies the trustee and
creditors any opportunity to bring claims against the homestead pursuant
to the FUFTA or any other state statute" because the Florida Supreme
Court in Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hill, interpreted the Florida
Constitution to mean that no creditor, unless within one of the
constitutionally prescribed exceptions, can reach into the homestead, even
if the debtor intended to defraud those creditors.20
The trustee's last option would be to ask the court to deny the debtor
his discharge pursuant to section 727(a)(2) of the Code. Section 727(a)(2)
gives the bankruptcy court the power to deny a debtor his discharge of
213 Id. S 522 (o)-(q).
214 See id. 5 522(p)(1).
215 11 U.S.C. S 522(b)(3)(B) (2007).
216 Wile "nonbankruptcy law" usually refers to state law, it is not limited to state law.
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753,759 (1992).
217 Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 58 (Fla. 2001).
218 See 11 U.S.C. S 544(b)(1) (2007).
219 See Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018, 1029 (Fla. 2001) (stating that even if a
debtor actually intended to defraud a creditor, the absolute bar provided by the Florida Constitution
prevents any creditor from reaching into the homestead's value whether the creditor uses FUFTA,
section 726.105, or any other state statute).
2 See id.
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indebtedness if the court finds the debtor defrauded his creditors." But,
proving fraudulent intent is difficult and bankruptcy judges are reluctant
to deny discharges based on the use of state exemptions.' The Eighth
Circuit held that, before dismissing a bankruptcy case, and thus denying
discharge, the court must find "a pattern of concealment, evasion, and
direct violations of the Code or court order which clearly establishes an
improper motive. .. ."' Courts have also held that "there is nothing
fraudulent per se about making even significant use of legal
exemptions."24 Indeed, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that it should be left
up to states to set exemption limits, and courts should "err in favor of the
debtor" due to the danger that courts may inconsistently or arbitrarily set
limits on state exemptions. 5
221 See In re Rudolph, 233 Fed. App'x 885, 888 (11th Cir. 2007).
m Cf In re Hunter, 780 F.2d 1577, 1579 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding objections to discharge are
to be strictly construed against the creditor and liberally in favor of the debtor); In re Miller, 39 F.3d
301, 306 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding "[a] creditor alleging intent to defraud under section 727(a)(2)(A)
bears the considerable burden of demonstrating actualfraudulent intent").
Creditors have the burden of proving debtors are not entitled to discharge and depending
upon the jurisdiction must do so either by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing
evidence. See In re Pettigrew, No. 91-6245, 1992 WL 26804, at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 13, 1992) (applying
a preponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether a denial of discharge was
appropriate); In re Cutignola, 87 B.R. 702, 706 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (applying the clear and
convincing evidence standard to determine whether a denial of discharge was appropriate). To deny a
discharge under section 727(a)(2)(A), the creditor must show that the debtor transferred or concealed
property within one year of the filing for bankruptcy, and that the transfer was made with the intent to
defraud creditors. Pettgrew, 1992 WL 26804, at *3.
Proving fraudulent intent is very difficult and fact-specific. See, e.g., In re Burzee, 402 B.R.
8, 13, 15-17 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008) (allowing discharge where debtor, within one year of filing for
bankruptcy, transferred her interest in the marital home to her husband and failed to claim over
$6,000 in an exempt retirement account); In re Moore, 375 B.R. 696, 700 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007)
(granting discharge even though the college-educated debtor sold her car for $4,000, sold her
engagement ring for $12,000, sold a watch for $500 and failed to list any of these transfers on her
statement of financial affairs, though the debtor subsequently amended her SOFA after a Rule 2004
examination was made that forced the debtor to include all those assets, except the car); Hanson v.
First Nat'l Bank in Brookings, 848 F.2d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 1988) (granting a discharge to a debtor who
transformed $30,000 in non-exempt assets to exempt assets on the eve of filing for bankruptcy); In re
Johnson, 880 F.2d 78, 84 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the power to deny discharge "should be
reserved for exceptional cases"). But see Norwest Bank Neb. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 872 (8th Cir.
1988) (holding the debtor, a doctor who liquidated almost all his non-exempt assets and placed the
money in exempt life-insurance and annuity policies, was not entitled to a discharge of his
indebtedness).
M In re Kerr, 908 F.2d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 1990).
224 Johnson, 880 F.2d at 83.
22 Id. at 83-84.
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A bankruptcy court could decide this fact-intensive and highly
discretionary decision either way. Certain facts militate in favor of
granting discharge. In the hypothetical, Mr. Caro tried to avoid
bankruptcy by restructuring his corporation, selling off the failing stores.
He then reinvested most of the funds from the sales of the stores back
into the corporation. Other facts can be used to argue that Mr. Caro's
discharge should be denied. For example, the $1.5 million transfer could
be deemed fraudulent because the transfer was to an insider while the
corporation was insolvent, and the corporation received no consideration
for the transfer. Under FUFTA's badges of fraud analysis," a bankruptcy
court could decide to deny discharge based on this transfer, which
occurred just over two years prior to bankruptcy. That said, due to the
presumption in favor of the debtor and the lack of any other concealment
of assets or fraudulent activity, in a close case like this one, the court is
more likely to err on the side of the debtor and grant Mr. Caro his
discharge."
In the end, this hypothetical demonstrates that BAPCPA's homestead
exemption-limiting provisions will not apply to debtors in states that
recognize the tenancy by the entirety estate and have unlimited homestead
exemptions so long as the debtor: 1) is married and bought the homestead
as tenants by the entirety; 2) exempts the homestead under the Code's
TBE Exemption; and 3) does not file for bankruptcy within two years of
receiving the non-exempt asset or assets used to pay for the homestead."
Currently then, the Code provides only married debtors with the
opportunity to abuse unlimited state homestead exemptions. Congress's
careless drafting allows for married debtors to escape BAPCPA's
homestead exemption-limiting provisions merely by knowing which
bankruptcy provision to choose at the time of filing.
226 See supra note 198 (listing the badges of fraud as recognized by Florida law).
2V While this decision could go either way, the burden is on the party seeking the denial of
discharge. Further, there are few acts amounting to fraud that occurred after the initial transfer; for
these reasons, the Court should err on the side of the debtor. See supra note 222 (explaining the
difficulty a party in interest faces when seeking to deny a debtor his discharge pursuant to section
727(a)(2)).
22 See supra Part IV.A (explaining how the TBE Loophole nullifies section 522(o)-(q)).
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B. The "Tenancy by the Entirety Loophole" in Otherjurisdictions: Arkansas,
Oklahoma, and the District of Columbia
In addition to Florida, the TBE Loophole is available to debtors in
Arkansas, Oklahoma, and the District of Columbia. 2 9 All three
jurisdictions recognize the tenancy by the entirety estate,23 0 and all three
provide residents with an unlimited state homestead exemption.23 ' First,
it should be remembered that all three states have specific exceptions to
their respective unlimited homestead exemptions.23 2 All three states and
the District of Columbia allow three specific creditors to foreclose on the
homestead: 1) a creditor who is a purchase money mortgagee; 2) a
creditor holding a city, state, or federal tax lien; or 3) a creditor who holds
22 See infra notes 230-231 (showing that Arkansas, Oklahoma, and D.C.: 1) recognize the
tenancy by the entirety law; and 2) have unlimited homestead exemptions). Thus, in these states,
debtors can employ the TBE Loophole. See id.
3 E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. S 18-12-608(a)(2)(B) (West 2007) (allowing grantees, under
Arkansas law, to receive real property conveyed through a beneficiary deed as tenants by the entirety);
OiA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, S 74 (West 2007) (recognizing that property may be held as a joint tenancy
or tenancy by the entirety); Travis v. Benson, 360 A.2d 506, 509 (D.C. 1976) (describing the
concurrent estate of tenancy by the entirety and finding that neither spouse may partition or convey
an interest in the TBE property).
For a discussion about the history of Oklahoma's tenancy by the entirety law and issues
courts in the state have had interpreting Oklahoma Statute title 60, section 74, see Tom R. Russell,
Title 60, Section 74 of the Oklahoma Statutes: A Unique Form of Tenancy by the Entirety, 58 OLA. L. REV.
317 (2005). The article interprets Oklahoma's tenancy by the entirety estate as allowing certain
creditors, the IRS for example, to attach and execute liens against tenancy by the entirety property,
even though this was not allowed at common law. Id. at 318-19.
A debtor in Oklahoma can use the Code's TBE Exemption, which he would qualify for
based on Oklahoma law, and he would retain his homestead because, while a creditor may attach a
lien to the homestead based on the above-mentioned Oklahoma statute, the creditor may not, due to
Oklahoma's Constitutional homestead exemption, execute on that lien through a judicially forced sale.
See OKLA. CONST. art. XII, S 2 (protecting debtors from any judicially forced sale); see also Toma v.
Toma, 163 P.3d 540, 542 (Okla. 2007) (interpreting the Oklahoma Constitution and a statute passed
in 1997 as allowing creditors to attach liens to homestead property but absolutely barring, due to the
state's constitution, a forced sale to execute the lien). Put more simply, the debtor at the bankruptcy
court level would use Oklahoma's TBE law to evade the restrictions of section 522(o), (p), and (q).
Then if a creditor argued, in bankruptcy court, that the debtor would not be exempt from process
under Oklahoma state law, the debtor would successfully argue that the state's constitutional
homestead exemption protects the residence from forced sale.
231 See ARK. CONST. art. IX, 55 3-5; FLA. CoNST. art. X, § 4; OKILA. CONST. art. XII, S 2;
D.C. CODE ANN. S 15-501(a)(14) (LexisNexis 2001).
232 See infra chart in Appendix A (listing details of certain states unlimited homestead
exemptions).
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a mechanic's lien on the homestead.23 These exceptions will not be
discussed because the article merely applies the hypothetical situation to
these four jurisdictions, and in the hypothetical, Mr. Caro paid for the
home in full, and no tax or mechanic's lien was attached to the
homestead.
First, when Mr. Caro used the TBE Loophole in Florida he received
the greatest protection because Florida provides an exemption that
absolutely prevents the forced sale or attachment of liens to the
homestead.24 In Florida, it does not matter how the debtor obtains the
funds to purchase the homestead. Indeed, even if the debtor obtains the
funds through criminal or immoral acts, the homestead is absolutely
protected from unsecured creditors."
Arkansas is the next most protective jurisdiction where debtors can
use the TBE Loophole. Arkansas has stated that purchasing a homestead
can never be a fraud upon creditors." Arkansas is the second most
protective jurisdiction because its constitutional homestead exemption: 1)
is only available to married debtors and residents who live with children;
and 2) it prevents forced sale and the attachment of liens, but does not
provide absolute protection to residents.2' In certain situations, the
Arkansas Supreme Court stripped homestead protections when a gross
injustice would result if homestead protections were left in place. For
example, when a debtor obtained the homestead by defrauding the seller,
the Arkansas Supreme Court abrogated the constitutional homestead
exemption and impressed an equitable lien upon the homestead.28 In
another case, the Arkansas Supreme Court completely denied homestead
23 Id.
2 See Havoco Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018, 1029 (Fla. 2001) (explaining that the Florida
Supreme Court interpreted the state constitution as forbidding the attachment ofjudgment liens to
the homestead property).
235 See Laurence, supra note 69, at 504-05 (quoting Havoco, 790 So. 2d at 1022). The
homestead exemption is guaranteed to every resident no matter the moral character of that person;
criminal punishment may be doled to residents according to Florida's criminal statutes but losing
one's homestead is not, "part of the punishment." Id.
2' See id. at 499 (quoting Chastain v. Ark. Bank & Trust Co., 249 S.W. 1, 2 (Ark. 1923)). The
Supreme Court of Arkansas stated that "[t]here can be no such thing as the fraudulent acquisition of a
homestead, for law permits it, regardless of the rights ofcreditors." Id.
2 See supra note 93 and accompanying text (explaining that Arkansas's homestead exemption
is available only to parents and married couples). Also, Arkansas's homestead is not as protective as
Florida's because Arkansas Courts have applied equitable liens to homesteads in the past. See id.
2 See Laurence, supra note 69, at 524-25 (discussing Mack v. Marvin, 202 S.W.2d 590 (Ark.
1947), where the Arkansas Supreme Court placed an equitable lien on a homestead when the debtor
purchased the homestead by defrauding the seller).
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protections to a spouse who murdered his wife? The court held that no
protections were available to the debtor because the property was no
longer held by a married couple and thus lost its homestead designation.
In dicta, however, the court stated:
This conclusion is reached based upon public policy underlying
the homestead exemption, the cases cited, and on the general
principles that a court of equity is a court of conscience wherein
justice is done sometimes stripped of technicalities and red tape,
and because a court of equity should consider the relative
positions of the various parties and render a decree that does
substantial justice to all.24
This dicta indicates that the Arkansas Supreme Court will strip property
of its homestead exemption if protecting the property would create
substantial injustice.241
By comparison, the District of Columbia is the third most protective
jurisdiction where debtors can employ the TBE Loophole to prevent the
attachment of liens or foreclosure. But D.C. is not as protective as Florida
or Arkansas because the homestead exemption is supplied through statute.
While D.C. Courts have not addressed the issue, one can argue that
D.C.'s UFTA would not apply to the homestead exemption since both are
statutes and should be read so as not to conflict with one another.242
Finally, Oklahoma's unlimited homestead exemption provides the
least protection because the state constitution only prevents foreclosure.243
The Oklahoma State Legislature passed a statute that allows creditors to
attach liens to the homestead.2 " Creditors in Oklahoma can then execute
2 Middleton v. Lockhart, 43 S.W.3d 113, 121 (Ark. 2001) (holding that a spouse who
murders his wife loses the homestead exemption since the owner of the house is no longer the "head
of a family" or married, and thus Arkansas law does not provide him any protection).
240 Id. at 583.
241 See Laurence, supra note 69, at 502 (arguing that while the Arkansas Supreme Court held
that the use of the state homestead exemption could never be a fraud upon creditors, the dicta in
Middleton seems to imply that the court may deny a debtor the homestead exemption if it is necessary
to balance the equities).
242 See generally D.C. CODE ANN. S 15-501(a)(14) (LexisNexis 2001) (providing D.C.
residents with an unlimited homestead exemption); D.C. CODE ANN. 55 28-3101-3111 (LexisNexis
1996) (enacting the UFTA in the District of Columbia).
243 See OKIA. CONST. art. XII, S 2.
244 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, 5 706(B) (2007).
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on those attached liens if and when the property loses its homestead
designation.245
This article will now quickly apply the hypothetical situation in each
available jurisdiction, examining whether each state's version of the
UFTA would trump that jurisdiction's homestead exemption because, as
explained above, when a creditor or trustee looks to state law as mandated
by the Code's TBE Exemption,24 6 he will use the state's UFTA to reach
the funds that were fraudulently transferred.
As of publication, only Florida has specifically held that the state's
UFTA, FUFTA, is absolutely inapplicable to the homestead because of
Florida's constitutional homestead exemption. 247 However, none of the
four jurisdictions has allowed an unsecured creditor to foreclose on any
property claimed as a homestead; thus, the trustee and unsecured
creditors cannot use the UFTA, or any other statute, to conduct a forced
sale.
First, applying Arkansas law to the hypothetical will not change the
result. While the Arkansas Supreme Court abrogated the homestead
exemption when gross injustice may result, the situations in which the
Arkansas Supreme Court did so are distinguishable from the hypothetical
situation. Mr. Caro did not defraud the seller, as the buyer did in Mack v.
Marvin.2 4 Instead, he paid the seller in full. Also, granting Mr. Caro the
homestead exemption would not create a gross injustice similar to the
Arkansas case where the state supreme court stripped the homestead of its
exemption when one spouse murdered the other.249  Here, the only
injustice is that creditors are not able to collect on claims from the
homestead, just as the state constitution intended.
Moving on to the District of Columbia, as stated previously, D.C. has
not decided any cases pitting its UFTA against its statutory homestead
exemption. On the other hand, due to the fact that the D.C. Council
recently passed the expansive homestead exemption, and the exemption
prevents both liens and foreclosures, it is possible that D.C. courts would
either hold the UFTA inapplicable to homesteads within the district or
hold that the homestead statute supersedes the UFTA in accordance with
245 Toma v. Toma, 163 P.3d 540, 547 (Okla. 2007) (explaining that lien on a homestead is
only enforceable when the property loses its homestead designation).
246 See 11 U.S.C. S 522(b)(3)(B) (2007).
247 See Havoco ofAm., Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018,1029 (Fla. 2001).
248 See Mack v. Marvin, 202 S.W.2d 590 (Ark. 1947).
249 See Middleton v. Lockhart, 43 S.W. 3d 113, 121 (Ark. 2001).
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the cannon of construction leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant,
"subsequent laws repeal those before enacted to the contrary."2 5
Finally, in Oklahoma, the constitutional homestead exemption
absolutely bars unsecured creditors from foreclosing on a debtor's
homestead.25 ' That said, in 1997 the State Legislature passed a law giving
unsecured creditors the ability to attach liens to the homestead.252 This
law appears to occupy the field. Hence, unsecured creditors currently can
bring a cause of action pursuant to Oklahoma's UFTA, and if an
unsecured creditor, or creditors, succeeds, it has as an available remedy
the attachment ofjudicial liens to the homestead.253 Creditors still have to
wait until the homestead property loses its homestead designation to
execute the lien, but at the end of the day-that is, at some point in the
future-creditors can extract value from the homestead.
Thus, it appears a debtor who funnels non-exempt assets into an
exempt homestead can keep his homestead free and clear of liens in
Florida, Arkansas, and possibly D.C. On the other hand, in Oklahoma, a
creditor cannot foreclose on the homestead, but can attach liens to the
homestead. All a debtor must do in bankruptcy to abuse these states'
unlimited state homestead exemptions is fulfill three requirements: 1) the
debtor is married and bought the homestead as tenants by the entirety; 2)
the debtor exempts his home under the Code's TBE Exemption; and 3)
the debtor did not file for bankruptcy within two years of funneling the
non-exempt assets into the exempt homestead.2 The next section
250 See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 285 (1981) ("Rather than join the Court in its speculative
efforts to deal with the doctrine of implied repeal, I would rest decision of these cases upon
an established rule of statutory construction: leges posteriors, priores contrarias abrogant. Sedgwick
describes this rule with approval as follows: 'If two inconsistent acts be passed at different times, the
last,' said the Master of the Rolls, 'is to be obeyed; and if obedience cannot be observed without
derogating from the first, it is the first which must give way.'") (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). The District of Columbia passed its unlimited homestead exemption in 2001. See D.C.
CODE ANN. S 15-501(a)(14) (LexisNexis 2001). If a D.C. Court were to examine the relative merits
of the two statutes, one could argue the last statute in time more clearly evidences the intent of the
legislature, and thus the homestead exemption would trump the UFTA, which was passed in 1995.
See D.C. CODE ANN. S 28-3101-3111 (LexisNexis 1996).
251 OlA. CONST. art XII, 5 2; see also OKLA STAT. tit 31 S 2(A)-(C) (defining the scope, in acres, of
the state homestead exemption).
252 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, 5 706(B) (2007).
253 See id.
2 See generally In re Hinton, 378 13.R 371 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (holding that section 522(o), (p),
and (q) does not apply when debtors exempt their homestead pursuant to section 522(b)(3)(B)); but ( 11
U.S.C. S 548(a)(1) (2007) (preventing a debtor from fraudulently transferring assets for the two year period
preceding the bankruptcy petition).
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examines each requirement to determine whether a debtor can realistically
satisfy all three prongs.
C. The Practicality of the "Tenancy by the Entirety Loophole"
Now that it is established where a debtor may move so that he may
use the Tenancy by the Entirety Loophole, one must ask: how realistic is
the hypothetical posed? Obviously, the toughest requirement for a debtor
to satisfy is to put off filing for bankruptcy for two years. BAPCPA
increased section 548's look-back period from one to two years for this
purpose.255 But in many cases, such as In re Leach, In re Hinton, and In re
Spatz, debtors made fraudulent transfers two years prior to filing for
bankruptcy.25 6
In Leach, the trustee sought to set aside a transfer that occurred three
years and ten months prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.257 The
bankruptcy court held the pre-BAPCPA one year statute of limitation ran
for section 548 of the Code, but the trustee used New Mexico's UFTA,
which had a four year look-back period." In Hinton, the debtor moved to
Florida after buying a $1.6 million house six years before filing for
bankruptcy. 259 The debtor staved off bankruptcy for six years despite one
creditor holding a $2.4 million judgment against him for almost four
years. 26 The debtor then fully exempted his homestead though the home
was likely bought with non-exempt funds.261 Finally, in Spatz, the debtor
made a fraudulent transfer in January 1989, but the debtor's involuntary
bankruptcy petition was not brought until June 14, 1991. Based on these
facts, the debtor was likely engaged in bankruptcy planning.262
255 See In re Leach, 380 B.R. 25, 28 n.2 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2007).
2 See id. at 25; see Hinton, 378 B.R. at 374; see In re Spatz, 222 B.R. 157, 157-60 (N.D. Ill.
1998).
2 See Leach, 380 B.R. at 29-30.
2 See id. It should also be noted that if this transfer had occurred in Arkansas the UFTA
would not be available because the statute of limitations in Arkansas is only three years. See ARK.
CODE ANN. S 4-59-209 (West 2007).
2 Hinton, 378 B.R. at 374.
2W See id.
261 See id.
262 See In re Spatz, 222 B.R. 157, 159-61, 165 (N.D. Ill. 1998). Thus, under the previous look-
back period of one year, section 548 did not reach the debtor's initial fraudulent transfer, but even
under BAPCPA's new two year look-back period, section 548 would not have helped the trustee.
Evaluating this fact pattern under Florida law, if Spatz took the proceeds of the fraudulent transfer and
placed them in his homestead, the trustee could not reach those funds either through section 548 or,
as explained previously, through FUFTA.
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The other two prongs are much easier to satisfy. First, in most
jurisdictions when a married couple purchases a home, there is a
presumption that the couple purchased it as tenants by the entirety.26
Thus, as long as the debtor and the non-debtor spouse do not explicitly
purchase the home pursuant to a different common law estate, this
requirement is satisfied. Further, all a debtor must do to fulfill the third
requirement is fill out his bankruptcy petition and claim the homestead
exempt pursuant to the Code's TBE Exemption rather than the Code's
Homestead Provision. Simple counseling by any competent attorney will
accomplish this requirement.
Though planning two years before bankruptcy is no easy feat, debtors
with sufficient available assets can stave off bankruptcy for two years.
Furthermore, approximately seventy-five percent of bankruptcy
petitioners are married. 2' Thus, there are many debtors who, with the
right advice, can evade the restrictions imposed by section 522(o), (p), and
(q). Now that the potential for abuse is apparent, and the homestead
exemption-limiting provisions have been shown to be de facto nullified,
the next question that must be asked is how can Congress fix the
problem?
V. THE SOLUTION TO THE "TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY
LOOPHOLE"
Some courts and commentators have recently observed that debtors
can use the TBE Exemption to evade BAPCPA's new homestead
exemption-limiting provisions.6 With this problem now fully examined,
the easiest way to close this loophole is for Congress to pass a law that
places at the end of the TBE Exemption, section 522(b)(3)(B), the
following language: "but if a debtor elects to exempt a homestead under
this subsection, then the homestead property is subject to section 522
subsections (o), (p), and (q) of the Bankruptcy Code." Thus, the
reformed section 522(b)(3)(B) would read:
2 See, e.g., Ramsey v. Ramsey, 531 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Ark. 1975) (citations omitted); Roberts &
Lloyd, Inc. v. Zyblut, 691 A.2d 635, 637 (D.C. 1997); Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So.2d
45, 49 (Fla. 2001).
264 TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 34
(2000).
2 See supra note 209 and accompanying text (listing cases and law review articles citing the
availability of the TBE Loophole).
2010] 45
46 UNIVERSITY OF MLAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:1
Property listed in this paragraph is - . . . any interest in property
which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement of
the case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to
the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint
tenant is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy
law, but if a debtor elects to exempt a homestead under this subsection, then
the homestead property is subject to section 522 subsections (o), (p), and (q)
of the Bankruptcy Code ...
Congress must accept the solution proposed, and to further demonstrate
why this solution should be immediately enacted, three arguments will be
presented to dispel any lingering objections members of Congress might
have about passing the proposed legislation.
Indeed, one can counter the solution proposed by arguing that the
government should protect the family and the innocent spouse from the
bad acts of the debtor. While this may be true, it is equally true that
Congress intended to prevent debtors from receiving windfalls procured
through abusive use of unlimited state homestead exemptions, and to
effectively prevent that windfall, the innocent spouse may have to suffer
for the bad acts of the debtor.26 Congress sought to cap the amount a
debtor may exempt in order to prevent the abusive use of state homestead
exemptions,267 and if Congress does not accept the suggested solution, no
de facto cap will exist; married debtors will continue to abuse certain states'
unlimited homestead exemptions.
Many arguments can be formulated that draw into question the
wisdom of closing the TBE Loophole. With them in mind, this article
26 See infra Part V (presenting three arguments why Congress could reach past the TBE
Shield and arguing Congress must do so to prevent the abusive use of unlimited state homestead
exemptions).
2 The House Report on BAPCPA stated section 522(p), "amends section 522 of the
Bankruptcy Code to impose an aggregate monetary limitation .... The monetary cap applies if the
debtor acquired such property within the 1,215-day period preceding the filing of the petition..."
H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 81 (2005). See also In re Wayrynen, 332 B.R. 479, 483 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2005) (interpreting section 52 2 (p) as limiting all debtors to the amount set out therein).
Many critics may argue that a cap is unfair because lower-income debtors can retain the
full benefit of their homestead if it is below the $136,875 limit. Yet, the cap forces debtors who were
wealthy to give up their million dollar mansions. The first response to this argument against a cap is
that Congress decided that it wanted to curb the abusive use of homestead exemptions and set a limit.
Second, federal tax law taxes wealthier individuals at a high rate and does not tax citizens in the lowest
tax bracket at all. The cap is in accord with the ability to pay theory. Wealthy debtors have lavish
houses and thus the ability to pay back more of their debts in real numbers, proportion should not
matter.
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presents three major arguments that further demonstrate why married
debtors should not be allowed to use the TBE Exemption to abuse state
homestead exemptions. These arguments seek to persuade Congress that
the solution proposed must be accepted, and Congress must close the
TBE Loophole in order to close the "mansion loophole"-the latter being
the sole impetus for enacting section 522(o), (p), and (q) of BAPCPA.Y
First, there is a strictly textual argument. Section 522(o)(4) states the
homestead shall be reduced to the extent non-exempt funds were
fraudulently transferred into "real or personal property that the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor claims as a homestead." 269  It then follows that
Congress accepted the possible negative effects the new statute would
have on dependents of the debtor through the loss of the homestead
through foreclosure to obtain the fraudulently transferred interest.270
Nevertheless, Congress decided the benefit-preventing debtors from
abusing state homestead exemptions-outweighed the cost to those
dependents.27 1  Similarly written, section 52 2 (p)(1)(A) states that the
debtor may not exempt property that exceeds $136,875 in "real or
personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a
residence."2 72  Again, the extension of this provision to dependents
indicates Congress's implicit acceptance of the harm to those dependents
that would flow from enforcing the Code section.
Congress determined the benefits of section 522(o) and (p)
outweighed the negative effects those provisions would have on
dependents, such as the loss of the family home.7 Thus, one can easily
argue Congress should also apply section 522(o) and (p) to the TBE
Exemption. Married debtors with children should not receive special
treatment that unmarried debtors with children do not.
268 See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 15-16 (2005).
26 11 U.S.C. S 522(o)(4) (2007) (emphasis added).
270 Congress must have realized that if the trustee was successful in proving fraud under
section 522(o) the house would be foreclosed on, and a dependent child would be out of a home.
2' See 11 U.S.C. S 522(o) (4) (2007). One could argue that it did not matter to Congress that
the debtor lived with a dependent.
272 Id. S 522(p)(1)(A) (emphasis added). See also id. S 522(p)(1)(D) (stating the same
information as section 522(p)(1)(A), but substituting the word "homestead" for "residence").
Z73 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 15-16 (2005) (citing the need to curb the abusive use of
certain states' unlimited homestead exemptions). Congress realized that a dependent may claim the
property as a homestead and attempt to exempt it from process in bankruptcy court. Congress wanted
to prevent this, and thus it included in section 522, "real or personal property that the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor uses as a residence." 11 U.S.C. S 522(p)(1)(A) (2007). See also id. 5 522(o)(4),
(p)(1)(D).
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Second, these subsections should apply even though their application
would infringe upon the TBE Shield. To elaborate, similar policy
arguments provide support for both state homestead protections and the
protections the TBE Shield provides property owners. State homestead
exemption law and the tenancy by the entirety estate protect similar
interests and are based upon similar public policy.274 Both protect the
marital unit "because of [the] high regard for family life[] and the public
values derived from the institution of marriage."275 Given that Congress
felt the need to prevent the abusive use of state homestead exemptions
outweighed the protectionist benefits those exemptions provided to
families then, similarly, the need to prevent the use of the TBE
Loophole-which allows for the exact same abuse--outweighs the
protectionist benefits of the tenancy by the entirety estate.276
This is not to say that state homestead exemptions and state tenancy
by the entirety laws protect the same debtors277--or even the same
property.278 Nevertheless, both are intended to protect the same interest,
the preservation of the home.2" As such, Congress should treat property
claimed under the TBE Exemption similarly to property exempted under
the Code's Homestead Provision. Congress must pass a law applying
section 522(o), (p), and (q) to the TBE Exemption. If Congress fails to
adopt the solution suggested, BAPCPA will prevent only single debtors
and gay and lesbian debtors from abusing certain states' unlimited
homestead exemptions.28 This leaves married debtors free to use the
2 Compare Kathryn M. Kelley, Enforcing the Federal Tax Lien Againstjoindy-Owned Property: The
Rodgers Equitable Discretion Test, 35 SYRAcUSE L. REv. 1321, 1326-27 (1984) ("The primary objective
of homestead laws is generally regarded as the security of the family") with Sterrett v. Sterrett, 166
A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. 1960) ("Husband and wife own an estate in entireties as if it were a living tree, whose
fruits they share together. To split the tree in two would be to kill it and then it would not be what it
was before when either could enjoy its shelter, shade and fruit as much as the other").
275 Robert D. Null, Note, Tenancy by the Entirety As An Asset Shield: An Unjustified Safe Haven
For Delinquent Child Support Obligors, 29 VAL. U.L. REV. 1057, 1083 (1995).
276 See id. (noting that homestead exemptions and the tenancy by the entireties estate protect
the same values).
2 Compare FLA. CONST. art. X, S 4 (protecting homesteads from the attachment of liens and
judicial foreclosure) with Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 52 (Fla. 2001) (listing
marriage as one of the necessary elements for property to be held as TBE property).
27 See Beal Bank, 780 So. 2d at 54 (holding that both real and personal property may be held as
tenants by the entirety).
m" See supra Part II.D (explaining that both protect the home to protect the family).
See Donna Litman Seiden, There's No Place Like Home (Stead) in Florida-Should it Stay that
Way? 18 NoVA L. REv. 801, 835 (1994) (arguing that the homestead exemption is more important to the
individual than to married couples because it is the individual's only protection covering the
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TBE Exemption and evade the restrictions imposed by section 522(o), (p),
and (q). Thus, the Bankruptcy Code, similar to the tax code, presents an
example of federal law providing married couples a benefit, while
simultaneously penalizing single and gay debtors.28 1
Finally, in other areas of both state and federal law, creditors have
been given the opportunity to reach past the TBE Shield to extract value
from property held as tenants by the entirety.282 in nine states and the
District of Columbia, despite the fact that property is held as tenants by
the entirety, a non-debtor spouse's interest is, "subject to levy and
execution."283 In the District of Columbia, New York, and New Jersey,
the purchaser of the interest at an execution sale becomes "a tenant in
common with the other spouse, but with no right to force partition." 28 In
Oklahoma and Tennessee, a creditor may execute on tenancy by the
entirety property, severing the unities and destroying the non-debtor
spouse's right to survivorship.285 Congress should do the same in order to
close the TBE Loophole.
residence). Married couples get the added protection of the TBE Shield, which usually prevents
creditors from placing a lien on TBE property if only one spouse is liable for the debt. Id. It is easy to
see that the homestead exemption is very different from the TBE Shield. The TBE Shield may
protect far more property than just the homestead; while the homestead exemption only protects the
home. Additionally, the homestead exemption is usually available to any debtor, not just those who
are married. In effect, Congress only restricted state homestead exemptions for single debtors and
debtors who are gay. It follows then, that married couples are currently able to exempt more property
under the TBE Exemption than single debtors can under the Homestead Provision because married
debtors evade all the new restrictions BAPCPA put in place.
281 Cf Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm: Bankruptcy, Choice of Law, and Same-Sex Marriage, 86
B.U. L. REv. 881, 885-86 (2006) (providing a hypothetical situation to explain how same-sex couples
are disadvantaged in bankruptcy court). If a Florida bankruptcy court applies Vermont law, the
debtor, who entered a civil union, can exempt jointly held real property and jointly held personal
property. Id. However, if the Florida bankruptcy court applies Florida law, the debtor will receive no
such protection. Id. Arkansas is the only jurisdiction reviewed that does not provide a single debtor
with a constitutional homestead exemption. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (delineating
who may claim Arkansas's homestead exemption).
M See POWELL, supra note 124, at 5 52.03.
2M Id. Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
and West Virginia allow a creditor to levy on one spouse's interest in TBE property, thus piercing the
TBE Shield. See id. at n.8.
a Id. S 52.03; see id. at n.9 (listing the states where a buyer of an interest in TBE property will
become a tenant in common with the other spouse). Specifically, in Florida, a judgment against one
spouse is not enforceable against TBE property. In re Buonopane, 359 B.R. 346, 347 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 2007) (citing Vaughn v. Mandis, 53 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1951)).
285 See POWELL, supra note 124, at 5 52.03 n.10.
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Indeed the Supreme Court, in a landmark tax decision, has done just
that. In United States v. Craft,286 the Court held that despite Michigan state
law barring lien attachment to tenancy by the entirety property where
only one spouse owed a tax debt, Congress, when writing the tax code,
intended to allow tax liens to attach to property held as tenants by the
entirety.287 Obviously, allowing the government to attach tax liens to TBE
property is distinguishable from allowing private creditors to attach liens
to TBE property in bankruptcy court.288 But Craft still stands strongly for
one proposition: if Congress sees a compelling problem and the only way
to solve that problem is by reaching past the TBE Shield, then the federal
government can, and should, reach past the TBE Shield.289
Congress, when drafting BAPCPA, felt strongly about preventing
debtors from abusing unlimited state homestead exemptions.2' Thus,
based on the Supreme Court's decision in Craft, Congress can-and
should- apply section 522(o), (p), and (q) to the TBE Exemption in
section 522(b)(3)(B).291 Congress has the power to subjugate state law
n6 535 U.S. 274 (2002).
M Id. at 274. The Court held that "[I]egislative history does not support respondent's
position that Congress did not intend that a federal tax lien attach to an entireties property interest."
Id. at 275.
2s IRS tax claims based on the debtor's failure to pay income taxes are different from private
unsecured creditors' claims in three important respects: 1) IRS income tax claims for the three years
prior to the debtor filing for bankruptcy hold the eighth priority and must be paid in full before any
money will be paid to unsecured creditors; 2) income tax liens are non-dischargeable in bankruptcy,
while general unsecured claims are dischargeable;and 3) in Chapter 13, a debtor must pay tax liens in
full to receive a discharge. See 11 U.S.C. 5 1322(a)(2) (2007); Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 46
(2002); see also Steve R. Johnson, After Drye: The Likely Attachment of the Federal Tax Lien to Tenancy-By-
The-Entireties Interests, 75 IND. L.J. 1163, 1170 (2000) (arguing that the general tax lien is expansive and
Congress "meant [for it] to reach every interest in property a taxpayer might have"). "'[Taxes are the
life blood of government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious need.'" Id. (citation
omitted). The author concedes that private creditors do not have as persuasive a need to collect on
commercial debts as the federal government has to collect on tax debts, and in fact, courts have held
Craft inapplicable to the Bankruptcy Code. See, eg., Harris Ominsky, Bankruptcy: Tenancy by the
Entireties Protected, 35 REAL EST. L. REP. 3 (2005) ("[The District Court for the Western District of
Michigan] held that [TBE property] is fully excludable from a spouse's bankruptcy estate, except
against joint claims made against both spouses.").
8 See Craf, 535 U.S. at 274 (holding that the general tax lien allows the IRS to encumber
TBE property despite state law barring such attachment). When the federal government wants to levy
upon a tax debtor's TBE property, it may do so pursuant to the Supremacy Clause by direct
Congressional enactment. See id.
2% See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 15-16 (2005).
291 See supra note 289 and accompanying text (arguing that since the government has the
power to reach past the TBE Shield to recover payment for unpaid taxes, Congress can and should do
the same to prevent debtors from abusing state homestead exemptions).
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when a debtor files for bankruptcy,2" and to effectively close the
"mansion loophole," Congress must reach past states' TBE Shields to
prevent debtors from abusing the Code.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress set out to reform the Bankruptcy Code and prevent the
abusive use of state homestead exemptions through skillful bankruptcy
planning.293 Congress was understandably unhappy with wealthy debtors,
such as Burt Reynolds, evading their creditors by purchasing lavish
mansions that were untouchable under certain states' generous homestead
exemptions.29 Nevertheless, a debtor can evade BAPCPA's homestead
exemption-limiting provisions by satisfying three elements: 1) the debtor
is married and buys the homestead as tenants by the entirety; 2) the
debtor exempts his homestead under the Code's TBE Exemption, section
522(b)(3)(B); and 3) the debtor does not file for bankruptcy within two
years of funneling the non-exempt asset or assets into the exempt
homestead. Allowing wealthy debtors to commit abuse of the Code by
taking advantage of unlimited state homestead exemptions is not only
fundamentally unfair to creditors,295 it also decreases the credit available to
lower-income residents in those states with unlimited exemptions, 296 and
it may raise interest rates in other economic sectors.297
All Americans pay an implicit bankruptcy tax in the form of higher
interest rates when debtors discharge their debts in bankruptcy, and thus
it is in everyone's interest to prevent abuse of the Bankruptcy Code.298
The economy is greatly affected whenever debtors go into default, as
M See U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress the power to establish "uniform Laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States . . ."). Based upon both the delegation in
Article I and the Supremacy Clause, Congress can abrogate state law when a debtor files for
bankruptcy. See id.; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2 See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 2 (2005) (asserting that BAPCPA "caps the amount of
homestead equity a debtor may shield from creditors. ..
2% See id. at 592.
"9 See id. at 2 n.1 (explaining that "bankruptcy is also a moral act ... [and] [t]here is a
conscious decision not to keep one's promises. It is a decision not to reciprocate a benefit received, a
good deed done on the promise that you will reciprocate. Promise-keeping and reciprocity are the
foundation of an economy and healthy civil society.").
2 See Reint Gropp et al., supra note 19, at 220 (finding that car interest rates may be higher in
states with larger homestead exemptions).
M See Marquardt, supra note 17, at 45 (explaining that the sub-prime mortgage crisis has
caused the interests rates on student loans to rise).
M See H.R. REP. No. 109-3 1, at 4 (2005) (citation omitted).
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clearly shown by the sub-prime mortgage crisis.2 ' Thus, any abuse of the
Code that gives debtors an incentive to divert cash and assets from
creditors should be eliminated.
BAPCPA has been criticized many times as being poorly drafted."to
This article has attempted to more fully expose a major loophole in
BAPCPA so that Congress may correct the mistake. Understandably,
both state homestead exemptions and state tenancy by the entirety laws
have great social value because they protect debtors who otherwise might
be left homeless and penniless."o' At the same time, Congress determined
it would curb the abusive use of state homestead exemptions when it
passed BAPCPA.o2 Congress has not satisfactorily done so.
In other areas of law, many states and the U.S. government have
reached past the TBE Shield, and thus Congress should not hesitate to do
so in order to prevent abuse of the Code."o3 Rich, married debtors should
not be allowed to plan and retain multi-million dollar mansions, while
creditors hold millions in unpaid judgment liens and unpaid claims. As
some members of Congress complained when BAPCPA passed, only the
"truly needy unsophisticated debtor" will experience the effects of the
new provisions.3*
These Congressmen, dissenting from the passage of BAPCPA, asked
"[w]hat message does it send when Congress subjects middle-class
debtors to a means test and other onerous changes to the Code, while
permitting the wealthy to continue to place their millions out of reach of
their creditors?"30 s This article only seeks to show Congress how it must
change the law to accomplish what it originally set out to do. Congress
set out to prevent the abusive use of certain states unlimited homestead
299 Vikas Bajaj & Louise Story, Mortgage Crisis Spreads Beyond Subprime Loans, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb.
12, 2008, at Al. For instance, the article cites the increase in the number of troubled auto loans. Id.
300 See, e.g., Alan Eisler, The BAPCPA Chilling Effect on Debtor's Counsel, 55 AM. U. L. REV.
1333, 1343 (2006) (citing deficiencies in BAPCPA such as BAPCPA not explaining how a debtor
should perfect a homestead exemption in another state).
301 See supra Part II.C (explaining the public policy rationales behind the homestead
exemption).
m See H.R REP. No. 109-31, at 2 (2005).
30 See supra Part V (explaining that the Federal Tax Code allows the IRS to reach past the
TBE shield and arguing Congress should change the Bankruptcy Code to allow trustees and creditors
to do the same).
304 H.R REP. No. 109-31, at 595 (2005).
3 Id.; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text (explaining the mechanics of BAPCPA's
"means test," which determines whether a debtor may file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the
Code).
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exemptions and stop the negative effects that follow from this abuse.30
To achieve this goal, Congress must change the law and close the TBE
Loophole.
M6 See generally supra notes 296-299 (examining the many negative effects that follow from
debtors failing to pay their debts).
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APPENDIX A





Texas CONST. art. Single adult or May Attach and Foreclose for: 1)
XVI, §§ 50-51. family homes; up to purchase money mortgages; 2)
ten acres in a mechanic's liens; 3) non-
city/town; 200 acres payment of state taxes due on the
in any other area; property or non-payment of
against liens and federal taxes; 4) an owelty of
foreclosure partition imposed against the
entirety of the property by a
court order or written agreement
of the parties to the partition; 5)
the refinance ofa lien against a
homestead; 6) consensual
mortgages; 7) a reverse mortgage;
8) conversion and refinance ofa
personal property lien secured by
a manufactured home to a lien on
real property
Florida CONST. art. X, s Single adult or May Attach and Foreclose for: 1)
4(a)(1). family homes; one- non-payment of state taxes due
half acre in on the property or non-payment
town/city; 160 acres of federal taxes; 2) purchase
any other area; money mortgages or any loan
against liens and made for the improvement of the
foreclosure homestead; 3) mechanic's liens
Iowa IOWA CODE Single adult or May Attach and Foreclose for: 1)
ANN. SS 561.2; family homes; one- for a lien that attached prior to
561.16; 561.21; half acre in acquiring the homestead and the
624.23(2) town/city; 40 acres debtor (former owner) has no
any other area; other assets available for
againstjudicial liens execution; 2) for a mechanic's
3 These exceptions are meant to be illustrative and not necessarily exhaustive.
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lien; 3) if owner puts the home as
collateral; 4) if no survivors and
prior debts; 5) for non-payment
of federal taxes
Oklahoma CONST. art. XII, Single Adult or May Attach and Foreclose for:* 1)
5 2; OKLA. family home; one non-payment of purchase money
STAT. 31, S acre in city/town; mortgages; 2) non-payment of
2(A)-(C); OKLA. 160 acres in any state taxes due on property or
STAT. tit. 12, § other area; against non-payment of federal taxes; 3)
706(B) foreclosure mechanic's liens;
* Other liens may be attached to
the homestead, but no execution
allowed unless homestead
designation lost
Kansas CONST. art. XV, Family home only; May Attach and Foreclose for:* 1)
5 9; KAN. STAT. one acre in non-payment of purchase money
5 60-2202(a). city/town; 160 acres mortgages; 2) non-payment of
in any other area; state taxes due on property or
against foreclosure non-payment of federal taxes; 3)
mechanic's liens
* Other liens may be attached to
the homestead, but no execution
allowed unless homestead
designation lost
Arkansas CONST. art. IX, Family home only; May Attach and Foreclose for:* 1)
SS 3-5; ARK. no smaller than 1/4 mechanic's liens; 2) non-
CODE. ANN. 5 acre and no greater payment of state taxes due on
16-66- than one acre in property or non-payment of
218(b)(3), (4) city/town; no federal taxes; 3) purchase money
smaller than 80 mortgages; 4) executors,
acres and no greater administrators, guardians,
than 160 acres in receivers, attorneys for money
any other area; collected by them and other
against attachment trustees of an express trust for
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ofjudgment liens money due from them in their
and foreclosure fiduciary capacity.
* Other liens may be attached to




B. the TBE unities are
severed
District of D.C. CODE Single adult or May Attach and Foreclose for: 1)
Columbia ANN. S 15- family home; purchase money mortgages; 2)
501(a)(14). unlimited in area; non-payment of state property
against attachment taxes or non-payment of federal
of liens and taxes; 3) mechanic's liens; 4)
foreclosure deeds of trust
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APPENDIX B
M8 See supra note 204 and accompanying text (explaining the ambiguity present in 5 522(q) and
arguing that the 1,215 day look-back period does not apply to 5 522(q)).
BAPCPA HOMESTEAD EXPLANATION OF HOWTHE CODE
EXEMPTION- LIMITING PROVISIONS PREVENT ABUSE
CODE PROVISIONS
11 U.S.C. 5 522(o)(4) Allows a creditor or the trustee to reduce the value of
the homestead if the debtor in the prior ten years used
non-exempt funds to purchase the home. The
homestead is reduced according to the value of non-
exempt funds funneled into the homestead.
11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1)(A) Debtor may only exempt the value of his homestead up
to $136,875 if the homestead was purchased 1,215 days
before filing for bankruptcy; creditors may go after any
value over this amount if purchased within that time
period, but this section does not apply to a family
farmer's principal residence, which was acquired before
the 1,215 day period, and it does not apply to any
interest transferred from an old residence purchased
before the 1,215 day period and transferred into a new
residence, so long as both residences are within the
same state.
11 U.S.C. S 522(q)(1)(A)-(B) Regardless of the amount of time elapsed, 3os a debtor
cannot exempt any interest of the home if the interest is
a) derived from 1) a violation of Federal securities laws;
2) fraud perpetrated while the debtor was acting as a
fiduciary; 3) any civil remedy under 18 U.S.C. S 1964;
or 4) any criminal act, intentional tort or reckless
misconduct that caused injury or death in the previous
5 years; and b) the aggregate value of the home is over
$136,875.
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